Future Armour

[GR66]

Just the GDLS part makes it more appealing. For better or worse GD is Canada's main manufacturer of armoured vehicles.

To me it would make more sense to hold off and see who is selected for the US Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program to replace their Bradleys. RFP's are scheduled for release next month. Ideally we'd request to be part of the review process with the idea of procuring the same vehicle as the US for sake of interoperability. Even better if the GDLS bid wins and our participation could lead to at least a portion of the production taking place in London.

 

[Underway]

OMFV competition info on the Lynx submission:

Rheinmetall reveals renderings of OMFV Lynx – Below The Turret Ring

I found this section particularly interesting....

While the Lynx is typically offered with either the Mauser MK30-2/ABM a gun or one an externally powered Wotan chain gun, Rheinmetall signed a Master Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with the US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center (DEVCOM AC) to integrate the 50 x 228 mm XM913 chain gun into the Lynx. This gun – which will be made by the US Army’s own Picatinny Arsenal – is understood to be the Army’s favored weapon system for the OMFV. The XM913 gun can be replaced by the smaller 30 x 173 mm XM813 gun – even in field, if the crew has access to a recovery vehicle or similar device capable of lifting the heavy gun.

The US Army favors the 50 x 228 mm caliber for its next generation IFV due to its increased combat range. In order to accurately hit targets at such longer ranges, the Lynx as configured for the OMFV program features a meteorological mast with crosswind sensor mounted at the rear of the turret. The 50 x 228 mm catridge is derived from the Oerlikon-designed 35 x 228 mm catridge, which is commonly used on anti-air artillery applications. The greater caliber offers significantly more payload, but it contains a nearly identical propellant volume; hence the kinetic energy – and thus anti-armor performance – is believed to remain similar to that of a 35 mm APFSDS round.

The point that the AP of the 35mm is the same as the 50mm is interesting. It makes me wonder about the 50mm and if its really that important. The extra payload is great but that also means you are likely halving the amount of ammo carried.

 

[KevinB]

OMFV competition info on the Lynx submission:

Rheinmetall reveals renderings of OMFV Lynx – Below The Turret Ring

I found this section particularly interesting....


The point that the AP of the 35mm is the same as the 50mm is interesting. It makes me wonder about the 50mm and if its really that important. The extra payload is great but that also means you are likely halving the amount of ammo carried.

The parent case is the important aspect for ammo size, while the weight of the projectile increases the actual ammunition space dense grow - as it doesn't neck down as much for the 35mm as the 50mm.
It's like 7.62x51mm and 6.8x51mm - both fit in the same belts (as does 6.5mm Creedmore and .260 Remington) and magazines due to the same parent case.

 

[MilEME09]

Well the winner of the light tank in tbe US.....drum roll please GDLS!

General Dynamics wins $1.14 billion Mobile Protected Firepower contract - Breaking Defense

The Mobile Protected Firepower program, a light tank for infantry brigades, is one of the Army's top modernization priorities and the service's first new design vehicle in 40 years.

breakingdefense.com

Maybe an interesting idea for Canada?

Atleast the winner is GDLS....ITB will not be a problem if CA goes this way. But as I pointed out in a snarky way elsewhere....let's buy the Euro one.

I have read we have our eye on this project, after all we have Cavalry Regiments now too

 

[KevinB]

I have read we have our eye on this project, after all we have Cavalry Regiments now too

Tracks…

 

[GR66]

Tracks…

Don't worry....I'm sure that GDLS in London can properly Canadianize these (for a healthy fee) to get rid of those pesky tracks for us!

 

[Underway]

I have read we have our eye on this project, after all we have Cavalry Regiments now too

Where have you read this? I would love to read this as well... lol

I'm not seeing how useful that it would be for a cavalry regiment myself, as the gun is really for infantry fire support.

 

[KevinB]

Slovakia picks CV90 in infantry fighting vehicle tender

The purchase is the latest move by Bratislava to weed out Soviet-era made equipment from its arsenal.

www.defensenews.com

Seems to be the actual MkIV

 

[suffolkowner]

Couple questions
A- Ajax vs. ASCOD, was/is the ASCOD as f'ed up but the Spanish and Austrians kept a lid on it?
B- What makes this any more appealing to Canada than CV90105 ASCOD LT105, etc?

For starters, an Ajax is min 10 tons heavier than an ASCOD. New turret design, different suspension, different engine, etc... Ajax is a derivative from the ASCOD but certainly not an ASCOD.

I think 3 ft shorter too

 

[MilEME09]

Where have you read this? I would love to read this as well... lol

I'm not seeing how useful that it would be for a cavalry regiment myself, as the gun is really for infantry fire support.

Read it on the DWAN, related to F2025

 

[Kirkhill]

Ascod 31 ft
Pizarro / Ulan 22 ft
Ajax 25 ft

Ascod 26 to 28 tonnes
Ajax 38 to 42 tonnes

 

[MilEME09]

Maybe we need to look at something like the M5 UGV in the future for light weight armour?

RIPSAW M5

Army's first Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) providing speed, mobility and unmanned capability.

www.textronsystems.com

 

[KevinB]

Maybe we need to look at something like the M5 UGV in the future for light weight armour?

RIPSAW M5

Army's first Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) providing speed, mobility and unmanned capability.

www.textronsystems.com

Key aspect is understand the goal of the US Army is to be able to send UCV/UAS places before Manned systems.
In keeping with established Canadian methods - you'd probably not have any manned systems as they'd be divested and the PY's harvested...

 

[FJAG]

Food for a bit of thought.

A “Once Was” Yelling at Clouds: Time for a Step Change in Armoured Vehicle Thinking?

Warfare is at an inflection point. It is time for a step change in armoured vehicle thinking. Jason Thomas shares his thoughts.

wavellroom.com

 

[FJAG]

And this.

Supply of 116 Abrams M1A1 Tanks To Polish Army | Joint Forces News

Deputy Prime Minister Mariusz Błaszczak has approved a contract for the supply of 116 M1A1 ABRAMS tanks for the Polish Army. ~ Press Release, Warsaw, 04 January 2023: [auto-translated] “We are strengthening the Polish Army. We are strengthening the armoured fist of the Polish Army, we are...

www.joint-forces.com

 

[daftandbarmy]

And this.

This is turning into a Neo-Marshall Plan.... which is awesome of course.

 

[GR66]

Food for a bit of thought.

A couple of quotes from the article that I found interesting and food for thought

Robotic operating concepts are another novelty to emerge from the 1990s. Emergent robotic operating concepts, which couple the optionally crewed fighting vehicle with robotics, are a technological dead end, and provide the worst of both worlds. The trade-offs are not worth the investment – weight and mobility costs to accommodate crew and technical and reliability costs to accommodate autonomy.

This rings true to me.

It is important to note that the full benefits of robotic land vehicles will not be seen until they have the potential to move and shoot faster than human beings can both tolerate and achieve, akin to the design advantages of air-to-air missiles over piloted aircraft.

The other application I see is where it's too dangerous to risk a manned vehicle (Recce options, minefields, etc.)

This may lead the combined arms team to unburden its requirements on each platform, the tank returning to assault support origins, and a re-emergence of the tank destroyer. The Infantry Fighting Vehicle focused on the protection of personnel and less on nascent light tank duties. The current equipment deficiencies in organic air defence, which the West had gotten away with for so long, will not solely operate by defensive aid suites. New systems embedded in organisations at a far lower level than extant doctrine will be required. Composite vehicle troops with the counter air platforms for example, or even perhaps astride breaching support, followed by unattended ammunition and logistic tenders moving from hide to hide (which is probably the richest, yet only lightly tapped vein for un attended systems at present). All cued and guided by organic aerial drones.

This raises the question of how far down the composite structure needs to go. Will Canadian-style Brigade Groups with specialized Battalions/Regiments grouping and re-grouping as required and "specialized" systems segregated into support elements remain a valid structure, or do combined arms extend down into the Company, Platoon or even Section level?

But other systems, especially those seeking to conduct infiltration operations to enable strike, are neither greatly assisted by heavy protection nor working in high concentrations. It may be that what is now obsolete is the medium-weight vehicle – they offer an unhappy balance of insufficient physical protection and being too large for effective signature management by concealment and stealth. Further, the West will have to consciously break the paradigm of crew survivability ‘above all’ and seek systems capable of significant infiltration and range. Examples include new types of Scorpions (or M114 Lynx) to current Supacat types, to the ubiquitous quad bike, with proportional drone capability, greater stand-off for offensive support, and mobile indirect fire.

The highlighted portion in particular (cough...LAV6.0...cough)e is a sign of how truly unprepared the Canadian Army is to face the challenges of a modern, peer conflict.

Land forces are coincidentally at a conceptual broach point, as Will Leben has articulated well: are they (land forces) about close combat or strike? As usual, the answer is both. The answer is a matter of choosing the balance point between the close combat and strike. This needs deeper consideration, because few militaries, if any, can afford today to go all in on both close combat and strike. Further, it must be noted that an imbalance towards close combat is regressive, which needlessly risks blood and treasure. Conversely, an over reliance on strike platforms leads to great vulnerabilities when dispersion and surveillance is denied. Such conceptual balancing deeply influences vehicle design.

Read almost any thread on this site about force structure and you'll see this debate taking place. I'm not sure there is an "right" answer as to where the balance point lies between close combat and strike because the potential conflicts we face by their very nature may require a different mix. I think the proper question that needs to be asked for Canada is where do we feel comfortable (politically) with that balance point being placed?

Hard-learned lessons drive design towards well-protected and powerful AFVs. To be sure, in armed conflict, the unexpected will occur and when it does, it is not generally pleasant. A sign of this is that the weight of armoured vehicles tend to go up during wartime, in the case of WWII, almost three-fold in three years, as seen with the transition from the Stuart tank to the Pershing tank. That said the current incrementalism—adding more and more to what is—tends to indicate a failure in imagination. Staying on one course for decades increases the risk of another set of hard lessons being learned whilst in the breech. This is never a good place to commence recovery.

The problem for Canada is that we don't really have the capability (or political interest) in imagining and developing a new concept in AFVs domestically and are really limited to what our major Allies are producing. I have a hard time thinking that this mindset can be changed short of some sort of catastrophic event.

 

[Kirkhill]

Food for a bit of thought.

 

[Kirkhill]

A couple of quotes from the article that I found interesting and food for thought

This rings true to me.

The other application I see is where it's too dangerous to risk a manned vehicle (Recce options, minefields, etc.)

Generally agreed - It makes no sense to build a vehicle to protect a 4 man crew when the 4 man crew may not be present during combat. A waste of steel. Optionally manned, or even unmanned makes less sense to me than Minimally manned when it comes to fighting vehicles.

This raises the question of how far down the composite structure needs to go. Will Canadian-style Brigade Groups with specialized Battalions/Regiments grouping and re-grouping as required and "specialized" systems segregated into support elements remain a valid structure, or do combined arms extend down into the Company, Platoon or even Section level?

The USMC will tell you that Combined Arms extends down to their new 15-16 man section with its "democratized" (I like that nomenclature) airpower.

The highlighted portion in particular (cough...LAV6.0...cough)e is a sign of how truly unprepared the Canadian Army is to face the challenges of a modern, peer conflict.

Agreement in spades. Particularly liked the reference to the Scorpion/Lynx/Supacat vehicles - light, mobile, more easily concealable, good carrying capacity and small crews.

Read almost any thread on this site about force structure and you'll see this debate taking place. I'm not sure there is an "right" answer as to where the balance point lies between close combat and strike because the potential conflicts we face by their very nature may require a different mix. I think the proper question that needs to be asked for Canada is where do we feel comfortable (politically) with that balance point being placed?

The problem for Canada is that we don't really have the capability (or political interest) in imagining and developing a new concept in AFVs domestically and are really limited to what our major Allies are producing. I have a hard time thinking that this mindset can be changed short of some sort of catastrophic event.

Do we need to develop new AFVs? Or do we just need to re-imagine the application of the existing technologies? Maybe even walk some of our decisions backwards to reevaluate some compromises that were hardwired in 40 years ago? Change the risks that we were willing to accept then for new risks we might have to accept now?

 

[Kirkhill]

Post 1973

EFOGM - 1980s
SPIKE NLOS - 2020

MGM-157 EFOGM - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Netfires NLOS PAM (Precision Attack Missile) and NLOS LAM (Loitering Attack Missile) - 2000s
Brimstone and Hero-120 - 2020

XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Unit cost	US$466,000 per missile (2011)

The technologies have been emerging since 1973. Improving and getting cheaper. The stress on the WW2 Combined Arms concept has been increasing.

I'm inclined to think the reluctance to abandon the Heavy Armour arose from three things:

1 - the existing system worked through Kuwait and the Invasion of Iraq.
2 - there was a lot of money invested in the old way of war and its systems.
3 - the technologies that threatened the existing order were rare and expensive.

The risks were high.

Also, it served everyone's interests to believe that nobody could compete with The Superpower and its way of war.

Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Israel have got people wondering if there might not be different ways of doing things - and that presents some avenues to instability. Curious that some of the most innovative thinking is coming from "middle powers" and "neutral states".


Forgot to add

Merlin - 1980s
Strix/Brimstone - 2020s

https://inf.news/en/military/e49d1026e7d911aa626bb266e7886a6b.html

Merlin was a fire and forget top attack anti tank mortar round that pioneered the MMW radar sensor employed on the Brimstone missiles.