Ok, I found some time to sit down, go over the responses and put something out. Thanks to everyone who contributed - the responses showed some original thought and different approaches to tackling the problem. When I measured the responses I received against the pre-determined evaluation criteria,
Haligonian's was judged to be the top response. Nice work.
Evaluation criteria was based on four factors concerned with the problem that I jotted down prior to issuing the problem:
1. How does the solution address the breadth of frontage that is clearly a lot for a single, foot-mobile infantry division to cover?
2. How does the solution utilize depth to address the overmatch in force ratio for the enemy?
3. What is the solution's bid for success and what are the strengths and vulnerabilities of that bid?
4. How is airpower utilized? Is it flexible and how is it linked to the defensive plan?
Some observations from the responses:
1. Responses were good in identifying the operational problem: how to address the enemy's superior numbers and mobility coming over a wide defensive frontage.
2. The problem of a 17km frontage is solved through using the defence in depth. The bid for success should be the counterattack, as hitting the enemy is the only way to strip him of his advantage in mobility and numbers. The problem gave leeway to determine what this depth would be. A key, in my view, is to figure out the sweet-spot in depth that allows you to engage the enemy and yet provide safe areas (out of enemy fire) for counter-attack forces to assemble and launch. My estimate, based on range of friendly and enemy artillery and mobility of forces, is about 10km. Going significantly greater then that means moving artillery or fighting without massed coverage, significantly lesser than that means counter-attack forces are liable to disruption from enemy indirect fires.
3. Breaking a defence in depth up into separate battle areas is part of the solution. All the responses took different cracks at this, and did well in identifying the need to slow, confuse, and attrit the enemy before hitting a main line of resistance.
4. Arrangement of forces is important, for in battle, it can become a source of friction. A big decision is to array forces in column (width, with each subordinate owning a piece of the 17km frontage back through the battle areas) or to array in echelon (depth, with each subordinate owing a 17km wide zone with another formation in depth). One of the more telling operational studies commented that arraying in echelon created problems in a fluid battle where depth was being surrendered as the battle had to be handed off from one formation to another as forces moved through each other. The argument was made that with each subordinate controlling a narrow, but deep, strip of the frontage, they could manage the battle throughout its depth and take on reinforcements to counterattack as they arrived. By having subordinate brigades conduct internal handovers instead of managing brigade handovers in the Divisions AO, the commander can reduce friction and focus on where to counter-attack with his or her reserve.
5. As mentioned, the bid for success in this should be the counter-attack, which responses generally indicated as the only way to defeat the enemy's advantages. The ratio of defending to counter-attack forces is therefore of key concern to the division commander. In an earlier thread, I gave an example of Mustafa Kemel's division at Gallipoli, where he maintained five of his nine battalions for counter-attack. I think 50% of the Division is a good aiming point to start with in this scenario, meaning that of the four brigades, you'd want one in depth, with a battalion from each of the other three to the rear of the main defensive zone. If you have more than 50% forward, it's liable to get fixed or beaten up by the enemies larger forces (and thus unavailable for counterattack).
6. Airpower is important. A big decision is whether to focus your sorties on what we now call Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) or Close Air Support (CAS) - one is hitting the enemy forward of friendly troops while the other is hitting the enemy near, and in coordination with, friendly troops. I'd venture that in this scenario, spreading the sorties is good, with emphasis being closer on either side to H-Hour, as the sorties (whether they be BAI or CAS) will help the counter-attack. Too soon, and the effect of the air strikes might lose its value by the time the land operation is ready to roll; too late, and the sorties might not be enough to help if the enemy gets momentum through your depth.
Again, great responses from those who submitted and thanks for taking the time to contribute.
As I mentioned, this scenario was taken directly from the defence of the Meuse River crossing by the French 55th Infantry Division in May of 1940. I've attached a poorly scanned diagram for Frieser's excellent
The Blitzkrieg Legend showing the "crazy quilt" layout of the defense. At page 145 of his study, he gives a pretty thorough breakdown of the key mistakes made by the defender at this battle. During the phony war, the French Division focused too much on the river, spent half its time focusing on concrete defenses, and didn't come up with a way to deal with enemy penetrations. Minimal depth and a lack of coordination with the French Air Force doomed the division and Guderian's XIX PzrKorps blew through it in a day (that is a great case study in the breakthrough battle, but that's another decision game....). So, all of you rated better than a 20th century 2nd Line French Infantry Division Commander!
I selected this for the first decision game as a follow-on from some good discussion on another
thread from earlier in the year. I still maintain my long-held opinion that the Canadian Army is, as an institution, weak at the defence. Our doctrine is not very sophisticated, and our officer education and training really lacks in developing a good understanding of depth, width, time, space, force ratios, and the critical role of the counter-attack in the modern defence in depth. Part of this is that, historically, we haven't had to defend much - we've been advancing and beating the Germans. I was happy to see that the responses generally acknowledged that the defence at higher echelons in more than just picking a piece of ground, selecting a killzone, and digging in.
There are some very good books out there that look at the concept of the defence in depth, which was basically developed by the Germans in early 1915. I researched this, and contemporary reports from the Russo-Japanese war and the Balkan wars prior to WWI showed defences were fairly linear - the Germans added depth in 1915 as French and British guns were starting to take their toll on more traditional defensive layouts. If anyone is interested in some good reads, two key books are
Lossberg's Memoirs (he basically developed the modern defence) and Wynne's 1930's study
If Germany Attacks. A more popular (although lacking in some finer details) but easily readible piece is Lupfer's
The Dynamic's of Doctrine, which covers the evolution of the elastic defence (a popular name for a type of defence in depth). I'd argue that nothing today, including PGMs or UAVs, has obviated the status of the defence in depth as the premier method of defense for a conventional force against a mechanized opponent.
So, discussion is the desired follow-through for the decision games here at Milnet.ca - I offer the follow questions to the readers. You are a brigade commander in the Baltics or Korea. How have things changed today? What kind of frontages can you expect to manage? How does rocket artillery, with extended range, affect your defence in depth? As a modern day Brigade or Division commander, how to you array your forces and how much do you reserve for the counter-attack?
