Army Reserve Restructuring
- Thread starter FJAG
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I’m just not seeing the point of reorganizing LAV BN’s without LAV (or other units without equipment either).
I know it gets into chicken v egg, but I fully believe that a reorganization needs to be complete with a significant capital investment plan for equipment.
I know it gets into chicken v egg, but I fully believe that a reorganization needs to be complete with a significant capital investment plan for equipment.
There most certainly is not surplus School buildings in Halifax. A friend of mine is a CMA in charge of purchasing at Halifax School board and She is sorting Portable bids this very week.
GR66
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This I think is key. Major equipment takes longer to procure than troops take to train.
This is where I differ somewhat with @FJAG on his restructuring plans. It appears to me that his objective is to maximize the number of fully-equipped, deployable units in the CA at the highest eschellon possible (i.e. fully deployable divisions). The reason I think this system works for the US is due to the large stock of equipment that they have in reserve. They can deploy the Regular Army and activate the National Guard units and when they take losses they can replenish the equipment from reserve stock and train replacement troops.
To my mind a CA with two deployable Divisions would be a "one and done" in terms of equipment. I personally think we'd be better off having two Divisions that each focus on deploying and sustaining a Brigade in combat (in terms of both personnel and equipment). For example, a Mechanized Division would have one fully manned Brigade forward deployed to Latvia, a 2nd 70/30 Brigade that could fairly rapidly replace the 1st Brigade while a 3rd 30/70 Brigade is working up to replace the 2nd Brigade. You'd also have at least one Brigade's worth of equipment in war stocks to be used to rebuild the 1st Brigade and cycle through that way. In an ideal World you'd have a full 2nd Division worth of equipment in war stocks for long-term sustainment and potential deployment of a 2nd Brigade.
This would require a continuous procurement of vehicles and weapons with the newest equipment going to the deployed Brigade and everything shifting down the line to the 70/30 then the 30/70 and finally war stock Brigades.
FJAG
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There are several major points to it.
1) one major point is to reorganize RegF existing RegF equipment and manpower holdings so as to increase the quality of leadership and training for the ARes;
2) another major point is to increase the number of deployable bde and bn headquarters so as to be able to create more battle group-sized mission elements for operations;
3) another is to increase the attractiveness of the army as a career choice for RegF by providing stable postings to urban centres and concurrently for the ARes by providing access to sound leadership and accessible equipment;
4) the last major point is that it creates a framework onto which equipment increases can be added over time at whatever rate and priority the government chooses to. In short it grows the useable structure of army without adding any expensive annual manpower and facilitates growing the equipment holdings at an acceptable rate;
The are several lesser points .
5) it breaks down much of the us and them divide between the RegF and ARes and facilitates cross component transfers so as to increase retention rates;
6) it maintains the core training and career structure of the units in that each 30/70 unit has a large enough core of RegF personnel to continuously conduct practical field training to the company level and synthetically to the division level, and to occasionally conduct practical field training to the brigade level by aggregating RegF units and sub-units. This is something that the 10/90 battalions did not have and could not do;
7) since the number of RegF sub units does not change, the ability to rapidly deploy roto zeros remains unchanged and through the additional numbers of bde and bn headquarters the ability to train and deploy follow on rotos of mixed RegF and ARes subunits is increased;
8) the increase in CSS facilitates peacetime NSE manning and the ability to provide support to a deployed field force of up to division strength;
9) it creates a structure that can easily be built on for a major force expansion in that any given 30/70 battalion has enough RegF and ARes personnel to expand into the core of a brigade to which can be added new recruits and additional equipment who can be organized and trained within the brigade.
That's agreed and a given to a point. The point being major equipment at certain levels. Some equipment can be produced very rapidly if facilities and arrangements are in place.
That is basically correct on both my aim and the reason it works in the US. The issue of "fully-equipped" has some flexibility to it in that the force that I propose does not initially need to be "fully equipped" in order to have more value than our current structure. It only reaches its maximum value once it is "fully equipped," however.
Once again, I basically agree and effectively that is what 1 and 2 div are designed to do.
1 Div has a complete CABG of existing equipment predeployed to Latvia. That is its roto zero equipment holdings. Its manning comes from the three CABGs in Canada where there are sufficient RegF personnel to man an eFP battle group rotation continuously (with some ARes augmentation), and to rapidly expand to a roto zero brigade with RegF personnel and "ready" ARes personnel. It also has follow up replacements from the remaining RegF and ARes personnel to the tune of two brigades worth. There is also sufficient equipment retained in Canada to replace up to one full brigade's worth of equipment from Canada's current stocks albeit they are not held in storage but are distributed amongst the three Canada-based CABGs (there is a presumption here being that we solve the CSS issue and eliminate the very large VOR rate currently plaguing the army)
2 Div's structure is to have a rapid reaction light brigade with two RegF airborne battalions and 2/3rds of a recce regiment and svc bn from 2CLBG while 5 CMBG maintains a rapid reaction force of one RegF LAV battalion. Effectively that creates a three-battalion brigade (2 airborne, 1 LAV bns) for rapid deployment anywhere in Canada or the world. In addition there are three additional brigade headquarters, 9 battalion headquarters and enough RegF personnel to deploy an additional 7 RegF light and 2 LAV companies (effectivley three battalions with equipment) and another 13 light and 4 LAV ARes coys for roughly five battalions (with only basic equipment). Once again, the equipment is with its units and not in storage.
Once again I agree. The structure as its stands is at minimal capability limited by the current holdings of RegF equipment. The equipment holes are unchanged. The point is to increase the capability of the army as a whole by leveraging existing ARes personnel and their limited equipment holdings to a higher plane of capability through improved leadership and regular access to RegF equipment in training.
Coincidentally, it creates a structure that allows a measured and planned expansion of equipment over time to grow the force as a whole.
I'm a firm believer in "shifting down" equipment. For example, since Europe is a looming threat as it stands, my first equipment priority would be to procure roughly 150-200 tanks, 350 IFVs and 80-100 SPs for 1 Cdn Div. That would fully equip 1 Div with 3 full CABGs (1 in Latvia 2 in Canada plus some spares) and allow 1 Div's LAVs to go to 5 CMBG and 34 CLBG. The acquisition of SP guns would allow three Fd Regts in 38 CAB to be fully equipped with SPs to support 1 Cdn Div and allow the reorganization of the M777 and LG1 holdings to fully equip 3 further Fd Regts as light (air portable) regiments to support 2 Div (or even further support 1 Div).
If I had my way and the funding was made available, I'd have this new equipment, as well as fleets of CSS equipment be manufactured in Canada at small to moderate scale facilities that could turn each required item of equipment out at the rate of 1/5th of the total required numbers per year and thereafter maintain the whole fleet with replacements and upgrades indefinitely.
Lets make it 100% clear. We all know that the army's equipment holdings since Afghanistan have been procured on the cheap and basically to support our current operational deployments at a roughly a single battlegroup level and all too often on a UOR basis that does not include life-cycle management. There are some projects which look beyond that but really not above two battle groups and a partial brigade level and not as a cohesive whole. Effectively Canada's army is funded, at best, to buy equipment for a single deployed battle group plus spares for training during peacetime and not with the scale which might be needed for a future war. IMHO that is irresponsible and a failure both within the government and army leadership.
The best plan that I can come up with is one that can be implemented with today's people and equipment holdings that increases the ability to utilize todays' capabilities and provides the vision for future growth. Do I think this plan will ever see the light of day - nope. It has two big flaws. First it takes away the centralized power of the RegF army (especially its three regiment infantry cabal that has trouble effecting a plan even within a rifle battalion) and secondly it eliminates some 100 plus ARes honourary colonels, about 80 honourary lieutenant colonels, about 100 each of ARes lieutenant colonels and CWOs, and a handful of ARes brigadiers and colonels. The one thing that you can count on about the leadership of any bureaucracy is that it does not accept a plan that would lop off its own heads even if it massively improves the efficiency of the organization as a whole.
Yup. This is a napkin force which is as thin and durable as any paper napkin is.
Pontification ends.
$0.02
