Army Reserve Restructuring

[Infanteer]

Don't forget about the Keto Gummies....

 

[KevinB]

I’m just not seeing the point of reorganizing LAV BN’s without LAV (or other units without equipment either).

I know it gets into chicken v egg, but I fully believe that a reorganization needs to be complete with a significant capital investment plan for equipment.

 

[DBNSG]

I struggle with the premise there is an empty, serviceable school in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, etc. A quick google found me articles about problems with overcrowded schools in Calgary, Edmonton and Halifax, without even scrolling. If they are empty, there is probably a reason. There would be no benefit moving from one under-maintained, crumbling building into another. At least the armouries are purpose built for the role we use them for. A more realistic choice would be a repurposed warehouse or industrial space.

There most certainly is not surplus School buildings in Halifax. A friend of mine is a CMA in charge of purchasing at Halifax School board and She is sorting Portable bids this very week.

 

[GR66]

I’m just not seeing the point of reorganizing LAV BN’s without LAV (or other units without equipment either).

I know it gets into chicken v egg, but I fully believe that a reorganization needs to be complete with a significant capital investment plan for equipment.

This I think is key. Major equipment takes longer to procure than troops take to train.

This is where I differ somewhat with @FJAG on his restructuring plans. It appears to me that his objective is to maximize the number of fully-equipped, deployable units in the CA at the highest eschellon possible (i.e. fully deployable divisions). The reason I think this system works for the US is due to the large stock of equipment that they have in reserve. They can deploy the Regular Army and activate the National Guard units and when they take losses they can replenish the equipment from reserve stock and train replacement troops.

To my mind a CA with two deployable Divisions would be a "one and done" in terms of equipment. I personally think we'd be better off having two Divisions that each focus on deploying and sustaining a Brigade in combat (in terms of both personnel and equipment). For example, a Mechanized Division would have one fully manned Brigade forward deployed to Latvia, a 2nd 70/30 Brigade that could fairly rapidly replace the 1st Brigade while a 3rd 30/70 Brigade is working up to replace the 2nd Brigade. You'd also have at least one Brigade's worth of equipment in war stocks to be used to rebuild the 1st Brigade and cycle through that way. In an ideal World you'd have a full 2nd Division worth of equipment in war stocks for long-term sustainment and potential deployment of a 2nd Brigade.

This would require a continuous procurement of vehicles and weapons with the newest equipment going to the deployed Brigade and everything shifting down the line to the 70/30 then the 30/70 and finally war stock Brigades.

 

[FJAG]

I’m just not seeing the point of reorganizing LAV BN’s without LAV (or other units without equipment either).

I know it gets into chicken v egg, but I fully believe that a reorganization needs to be complete with a significant capital investment plan for equipment.

There are several major points to it.

1) one major point is to reorganize RegF existing RegF equipment and manpower holdings so as to increase the quality of leadership and training for the ARes;

2) another major point is to increase the number of deployable bde and bn headquarters so as to be able to create more battle group-sized mission elements for operations;

3) another is to increase the attractiveness of the army as a career choice for RegF by providing stable postings to urban centres and concurrently for the ARes by providing access to sound leadership and accessible equipment;

4) the last major point is that it creates a framework onto which equipment increases can be added over time at whatever rate and priority the government chooses to. In short it grows the useable structure of army without adding any expensive annual manpower and facilitates growing the equipment holdings at an acceptable rate;

The are several lesser points .

5) it breaks down much of the us and them divide between the RegF and ARes and facilitates cross component transfers so as to increase retention rates;

6) it maintains the core training and career structure of the units in that each 30/70 unit has a large enough core of RegF personnel to continuously conduct practical field training to the company level and synthetically to the division level, and to occasionally conduct practical field training to the brigade level by aggregating RegF units and sub-units. This is something that the 10/90 battalions did not have and could not do;

7) since the number of RegF sub units does not change, the ability to rapidly deploy roto zeros remains unchanged and through the additional numbers of bde and bn headquarters the ability to train and deploy follow on rotos of mixed RegF and ARes subunits is increased;

8) the increase in CSS facilitates peacetime NSE manning and the ability to provide support to a deployed field force of up to division strength;

9) it creates a structure that can easily be built on for a major force expansion in that any given 30/70 battalion has enough RegF and ARes personnel to expand into the core of a brigade to which can be added new recruits and additional equipment who can be organized and trained within the brigade.

This I think is key. Major equipment takes longer to procure than troops take to train.

That's agreed and a given to a point. The point being major equipment at certain levels. Some equipment can be produced very rapidly if facilities and arrangements are in place.

This is where I differ somewhat with @FJAG on his restructuring plans. It appears to me that his objective is to maximize the number of fully-equipped, deployable units in the CA at the highest eschellon possible (i.e. fully deployable divisions). The reason I think this system works for the US is due to the large stock of equipment that they have in reserve. They can deploy the Regular Army and activate the National Guard units and when they take losses they can replenish the equipment from reserve stock and train replacement troops.

That is basically correct on both my aim and the reason it works in the US. The issue of "fully-equipped" has some flexibility to it in that the force that I propose does not initially need to be "fully equipped" in order to have more value than our current structure. It only reaches its maximum value once it is "fully equipped," however.

To my mind a CA with two deployable Divisions would be a "one and done" in terms of equipment. I personally think we'd be better off having two Divisions that each focus on deploying and sustaining a Brigade in combat (in terms of both personnel and equipment). For example, a Mechanized Division would have one fully manned Brigade forward deployed to Latvia, a 2nd 70/30 Brigade that could fairly rapidly replace the 1st Brigade while a 3rd 30/70 Brigade is working up to replace the 2nd Brigade. You'd also have at least one Brigade's worth of equipment in war stocks to be used to rebuild the 1st Brigade and cycle through that way. In an ideal World you'd have a full 2nd Division worth of equipment in war stocks for long-term sustainment and potential deployment of a 2nd Brigade.

Once again, I basically agree and effectively that is what 1 and 2 div are designed to do.

1 Div has a complete CABG of existing equipment predeployed to Latvia. That is its roto zero equipment holdings. Its manning comes from the three CABGs in Canada where there are sufficient RegF personnel to man an eFP battle group rotation continuously (with some ARes augmentation), and to rapidly expand to a roto zero brigade with RegF personnel and "ready" ARes personnel. It also has follow up replacements from the remaining RegF and ARes personnel to the tune of two brigades worth. There is also sufficient equipment retained in Canada to replace up to one full brigade's worth of equipment from Canada's current stocks albeit they are not held in storage but are distributed amongst the three Canada-based CABGs (there is a presumption here being that we solve the CSS issue and eliminate the very large VOR rate currently plaguing the army)

2 Div's structure is to have a rapid reaction light brigade with two RegF airborne battalions and 2/3rds of a recce regiment and svc bn from 2CLBG while 5 CMBG maintains a rapid reaction force of one RegF LAV battalion. Effectively that creates a three-battalion brigade (2 airborne, 1 LAV bns) for rapid deployment anywhere in Canada or the world. In addition there are three additional brigade headquarters, 9 battalion headquarters and enough RegF personnel to deploy an additional 7 RegF light and 2 LAV companies (effectivley three battalions with equipment) and another 13 light and 4 LAV ARes coys for roughly five battalions (with only basic equipment). Once again, the equipment is with its units and not in storage.

This would require a continuous procurement of vehicles and weapons with the newest equipment going to the deployed Brigade and everything shifting down the line to the 70/30 then the 30/70 and finally war stock Brigades.

Once again I agree. The structure as its stands is at minimal capability limited by the current holdings of RegF equipment. The equipment holes are unchanged. The point is to increase the capability of the army as a whole by leveraging existing ARes personnel and their limited equipment holdings to a higher plane of capability through improved leadership and regular access to RegF equipment in training.

Coincidentally, it creates a structure that allows a measured and planned expansion of equipment over time to grow the force as a whole.

I'm a firm believer in "shifting down" equipment. For example, since Europe is a looming threat as it stands, my first equipment priority would be to procure roughly 150-200 tanks, 350 IFVs and 80-100 SPs for 1 Cdn Div. That would fully equip 1 Div with 3 full CABGs (1 in Latvia 2 in Canada plus some spares) and allow 1 Div's LAVs to go to 5 CMBG and 34 CLBG. The acquisition of SP guns would allow three Fd Regts in 38 CAB to be fully equipped with SPs to support 1 Cdn Div and allow the reorganization of the M777 and LG1 holdings to fully equip 3 further Fd Regts as light (air portable) regiments to support 2 Div (or even further support 1 Div).

If I had my way and the funding was made available, I'd have this new equipment, as well as fleets of CSS equipment be manufactured in Canada at small to moderate scale facilities that could turn each required item of equipment out at the rate of 1/5th of the total required numbers per year and thereafter maintain the whole fleet with replacements and upgrades indefinitely.

Lets make it 100% clear. We all know that the army's equipment holdings since Afghanistan have been procured on the cheap and basically to support our current operational deployments at a roughly a single battlegroup level and all too often on a UOR basis that does not include life-cycle management. There are some projects which look beyond that but really not above two battle groups and a partial brigade level and not as a cohesive whole. Effectively Canada's army is funded, at best, to buy equipment for a single deployed battle group plus spares for training during peacetime and not with the scale which might be needed for a future war. IMHO that is irresponsible and a failure both within the government and army leadership.

The best plan that I can come up with is one that can be implemented with today's people and equipment holdings that increases the ability to utilize todays' capabilities and provides the vision for future growth. Do I think this plan will ever see the light of day - nope. It has two big flaws. First it takes away the centralized power of the RegF army (especially its three regiment infantry cabal that has trouble effecting a plan even within a rifle battalion) and secondly it eliminates some 100 plus ARes honourary colonels, about 80 honourary lieutenant colonels, about 100 each of ARes lieutenant colonels and CWOs, and a handful of ARes brigadiers and colonels. The one thing that you can count on about the leadership of any bureaucracy is that it does not accept a plan that would lop off its own heads even if it massively improves the efficiency of the organization as a whole.

Yup. This is a napkin force which is as thin and durable as any paper napkin is.

Pontification ends.

$0.02

 

[Rjgillies]

Although off topic Nicholas Drummond has reposted his view of a 2 division British Army on X.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1789283915347198351

 

[FJAG]

We haven't had a post here - nor a napkin force diagram - for some time so here goes.

We should really retitle this thread as "Army Restructuring" because any attempt to restructure the ARes without it being part of a larger restructure of the entire army would be a mug's game at the best of times.

So this one is a look at a new model close support artillery regiment within the framework of a 30/70 brigade. There are some notes on the image and a few additional comments below.



Note that I'm looking at organizing all manoeuvre and CS units into a HQ coy, 3 x line coys, 1 x CS coy and an attached CSS coy. HQ has some organic support elements (such as a bn/regt QM, Sigs, and medics) and CSS provides the key maint and further logistics needed but which is under the technical supervision of the vde svc bn.

The organization has the ability to generate one complete gun battery with its associated tactical troop and CSS troop on short notice with its 100% RegF strength and the ability to mobilize a full regiment. To mobilize an entire regiment requires that either the ARes elements are called up or additional RegF subunits, troops, detachments or personnel from other units be attached.

Note that I've added a Launcher troop to each gun battery to provide direct support with heavier precision UAV weapons to each supported manoeuvre battalion. There are control teams within the launcher troops to launch and guide the UAV forward and, if necessary, effect engagement. The intended process, however, is for the launcher troop to hand off the UAV in-air to a FOO or forward UAV controller for final attack. Both surveillance and attack systems will be held by the launcher troop.

I've merged the resources of the current OP battery and STA battery into one battery. The battery's HQ provides both the bde FSVV and the Regt'l CP (RCPO). There are three tactical troops, one each for each of the manoeuvre bns with the bde.

Note that I see a general support regiment using a similar structure but without a tactical battery. It could be equipped with precision rockets, even heavier UAVs and/or longer range guns.

Let the useful comments and the snide remarks commence!

 

[ArmyRick]

Although off topic Nicholas Drummond has reposted his view of a 2 division British Army on X.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1789283915347198351

What in the dashing cows is a "Light Reconnaissance Strike" Infantry? Its apparently in the 16 AA Brigade. Anyone?

 

[FJAG]

What in the dashing cows is a "Light Reconnaissance Strike" Infantry? Its apparently in the 16 AA Brigade. Anyone?

Here's something from the UK army's web site

As light recce strike, 1 R IRISH is mounted in Jackal and Foxhound patrol vehicles to enhance the mobility, firepower, and reconnaissance capabilities of the brigade. It has the flexibility to deploy onto operations by airlanding or driving, and the skills and mindset to conduct air assault operations.

Speaking about the new role, 1 R IRISH’s Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Andy Bourne said:

“We have joined the exercise as a semi mechanised battalion, and we work in concert with 2 RGR to either clear the way for them to assault buildings or to secure an airfield for them to drop into. We give the Brigade Commander eyes and ears over the horizon.

 

[PrairieFella]

Here's something from the UK army's web site

The Light Recce Strike is making some waves in the RCAC at the moment. The brigade contains RAC personnel in the light role. This might be where the "light Cav" chips ultimately fall. It's certainly an interesting concept.

Here's an article about the brigade context.

SCORPION CYCLONE ~ 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike BCT | Joint Forces News

SCORPION CYCLONE 2023 was the first major field exercise for the UK's new 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike (1 DRS) Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

www.joint-forces.com

Personally I like the modularity, makes it a very flexible formation and man does it bring some fires to bear.

 

[FJAG]

The Light Recce Strike is making some waves in the RCAC at the moment. The brigade contains RAC personnel in the light role. This might be where the "light Cav" chips ultimately fall. It's certainly an interesting concept.

The RCAC is looking for a way to stay relevant and protect PYs with cavalry. I sense light recce strike as a role that has both recce and infantry components which may end up with a hat badge bun fight. Personally I think we have just enough infantry to fill the required "pure" mech and light infantry roles while there appears to be a surplus of "recce" of both the RegF and ARes persuasion. Perhaps "light recce strike" is their future.

 

[PrairieFella]

The RCAC is looking for a way to stay relevant and protect PYs with cavalry. I sense light recce strike as a role that has both recce and infantry components which may end up with a hat badge bun fight. Personally I think we have just enough infantry to fill the required "pure" mech and light infantry roles while there appears to be a surplus of "recce" of both the RegF and ARes persuasion. Perhaps "light recce strike" is their future.

Any bunfight would be due to infantry role creep, not the other way around. I envision that the infantry do the FIND and the Armour (Ajax and Warrior) do the FIX. Of course there's some overlap but the Bde Comd needs that recce moving, better to handover and allow the armour folk to fight the good fight until fires wipe out the threat. The RAC light PMV in Jackals will probably be on guard, flank sec and RAS tasks. Purely my head canon however.

 

[markppcli]

Any bunfight would be due to infantry role creep, not the other way around. I envision that the infantry do the FIND and the Armour (Ajax and Warrior) do the FIX. Of course there's some overlap but the Bde Comd needs that recce moving, better to handover and allow the armour folk to fight the good fight until fires wipe out the threat. The RAC light PMV in Jackals will probably be on guard, flank sec and RAS tasks. Purely my head canon however.

The only “light recce strike” is one Bn in 16 air assault, it’s a way to light motorized without saying light motorized. How they work vs the light cav in Jackals is… questionable I guess, given that the Bde doesn’t have any RAC in it, I suspect the roles have a lot of carry over.

I tend to agree that “light cav” is the RCACs way of finding a purpose for themselves inside mechanized Bde’s when they’re offering less firepower and mobility than the infantry for 2 and 5 Bde.

 

[PrairieFella]

The only “light recce strike” is one Bn in 16 air assault, it’s a way to light motorized without saying light motorized. How they work vs the light cav in Jackals is… questionable I guess, given that the Bde doesn’t have any RAC in it, I suspect the roles have a lot of carry over.

I tend to agree that “light cav” is the RCACs way of finding a purpose for themselves inside mechanized Bde’s when they’re offering less firepower and mobility than the infantry for 2 and 5 Bde.

Ah. I'm mixing it up with deep strike (1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike BCT) as per the article I posted. You're not wrong about the current state of light cav. There is a serious equipment gap in the RCAC but noone gives a shit about the crewmen when there's ships and planes to buy haha.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Light Recce Strike is making some waves in the RCAC at the moment. The brigade contains RAC personnel in the light role. This might be where the "light Cav" chips ultimately fall. It's certainly an interesting concept.

Here's an article about the brigade context.

SCORPION CYCLONE ~ 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike BCT | Joint Forces News

SCORPION CYCLONE 2023 was the first major field exercise for the UK's new 1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike (1 DRS) Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

www.joint-forces.com

Personally I like the modularity, makes it a very flexible formation and man does it bring some fires to bear.

In other words:

Tell me you're too cheap to invest in a credible heavy armoured force without telling me you're too cheap to invest in a credible heavy armoured force

 

[FJAG]

Ah. I'm mixing it up with deep strike (1st Deep Reconnaissance Strike BCT) as per the article I posted. You're not wrong about the current state of light cav. There is a serious equipment gap in the RCAC but noone gives a shit about the crewmen when there's ships and planes to buy haha.

1st Deep Recce Strike started as an interesting concept (rapidly deployable deep reconnaissance assets with a capability for active direct fire engagement coupled to long range indirect fire assets to allow a major engagement well forward of the main defensive position allowing the main force to deploy).

It's become somewhat of a "neither fish nor fowl" organization, IMHO, when all of 3 Div's arty assets were thrown into it. Again, IMHO, it would have been far better to put all of the recce assets and their support elements into one brigade and all the artillery in another. There is no benefit whatsoever in mixing deep recce with all the artillery and some issues related to providing fire support to the div's armoured brigades. Creating a separate arty bde (like most real divisions do) provides the flexibility to the div commander to tailor the artillery fight to suit the circumstances of the moment and allows the artillery command and control elements to concentrate on the div as a whole rather than risking being caught up in the strike brigade's fight.

It will be interesting to see how the 3 Div arty picture will shake out once the 14 new Archers and 116 Boxer RCH 155s are on the ground. The Brits currently only have to AS-90 equipped arty regiments (1 and 19) for a total of 36 guns. There is also 104 Fd which is a reserve regiment equipped with the light gun but with the role to augment and reinforce 1 and 19 Regts. (not to forget that there are also 2 RegF and 1 ResF MLRS Regts (3, 25 and 101) and an STA Regt (5)).

1 Div has 4 Fd Regt (backstopped by 105 Fd Regt a reserve unit) both equipped with light guns, but since they support 7th Light Mech Bde, they could conceivably also go to Boxer RCH 155. There is also 7 Para and 103 Fd, a reserve unit, which will probably stay with light guns as they each support light brigades.

So potentially 3 RegF Regts (1, 19, and 4) could go to Boxer RCH 155 (54 guns) and another 2 Reserve regt's (104 and 105) could as well (36 if fully equipped) for a total of 90 which leaves a reasonable 26 as operational stock, training guns and spares. I'd guess that the reserves get less and the forward deployed operational stocks bet more.

But I digress. The issue is the artillery should be taken out of 1st deep Recce Strike and made into a 3 Div Arty Bde.

 

[PrairieFella]

1st Deep Recce Strike started as an interesting concept (rapidly deployable deep reconnaissance assets with a capability for active direct fire engagement coupled to long range indirect fire assets to allow a major engagement well forward of the main defensive position allowing the main force to deploy).

It's become somewhat of a "neither fish nor fowl" organization, IMHO, when all of 3 Div's arty assets were thrown into it. Again, IMHO, it would have been far better to put all of the recce assets and their support elements into one brigade and all the artillery in another. There is no benefit whatsoever in mixing deep recce with all the artillery and some issues related to providing fire support to the div's armoured brigades. Creating a separate arty bde (like most real divisions do) provides the flexibility to the div commander to tailor the artillery fight to suit the circumstances of the moment and allows the artillery command and control elements to concentrate on the div as a whole rather than risking being caught up in the strike brigade's fight.

It will be interesting to see how the 3 Div arty picture will shake out once the 14 new Archers and 116 Boxer RCH 155s are on the ground. The Brits currently only have to AS-90 equipped arty regiments (1 and 19) for a total of 36 guns. There is also 104 Fd which is a reserve regiment equipped with the light gun but with the role to augment and reinforce 1 and 19 Regts. (not to forget that there are also 2 RegF and 1 ResF MLRS Regts (3, 25 and 101) and an STA Regt (5)).

1 Div has 4 Fd Regt (backstopped by 105 Fd Regt a reserve unit) both equipped with light guns, but since they support 7th Light Mech Bde, they could conceivably also go to Boxer RCH 155. There is also 7 Para and 103 Fd, a reserve unit, which will probably stay with light guns as they each support light brigades.

So potentially 3 RegF Regts (1, 19, and 4) could go to Boxer RCH 155 (54 guns) and another 2 Reserve regt's (104 and 105) could as well (36 if fully equipped) for a total of 90 which leaves a reasonable 26 as operational stock, training guns and spares. I'd guess that the reserves get less and the forward deployed operational stocks bet more.

But I digress. The issue is the artillery should be taken out of 1st deep Recce Strike and made into a 3 Div Arty Bde.

Well that was a devastating effective teardown of why it's dumb to have the arty in the brigade lol.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well that was a devastating effective teardown of why it's dumb to have the arty in the brigade lol.

Kind of like a good fire mission, right?

 

[PrairieFella]

Kind of like a good fire mission, right?

King of War lol

 

[FJAG]

We had an interesting back and forth in another thread about the artillery regiments' OP (or TAC) batteries.

I gave the matter some thought and have reached the conclusion that neither the OP battery nor the STA battery are necessary or, for that matter, even desirable. Accordingly I have changed the layout for the organization of a future force CS artillery regiment pattern to a new version 2.02. (Strangely enough it brings us back to the type of organization that served us well throughout WW2 and thereafter until we started mucking around with it during Arty Transformation 2005 and thereafter - all things old are new again.)

Note the following changes. With the elimination of the TAC battery, the regimental OpsO (and his FSCC) and the radar troop (and its BAIO or STACC) go into the regimental HQ battery together with the sigs tp, the RQM and the med tp.

The Tactical troops (Bty FSCC, FOOs, JTACs and UAVOs) go into each line battery.) Note as well that I have changed the UAV launcher troop symbols to make the main symbol the arty indirect fires role with a UAV delivery modifier. These three troops effectively come from the current regiments' MUAV troops but converted as launchers of arty UAV surveillance and strike systems. The original role of the MUAV tp to provide surveillance for the supported manoeuvre company commanders is mostly handed off to supported manoeuvre battalions' organic UAV resources. There is still some indirect support to each battalion because the battery as a whole, and its observers in particular, still support manoeuvre battalions.



Note as well that a GS regiment would probably have a similar structure save and except there would be no Tac Tps and radars would increase in range and, perhaps, number of systems.