daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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Air Defence
Artillery
Counter Battery
EW
And 'night capabilities'.
I understand that our ability to operate at night alongside US troops is unsatisfactory.
Air Defence
Artillery
Counter Battery
EW
EW - Full time trade - EW happens even when bullets and bombs don'tAir Defence
Artillery
Counter Battery
EW
I'll meet you part way on the "Artillery" element. Assuming we're talking about Reg F CMBGs;EW - Full time trade - EW happens even when bullets and bombs don't
Counter-Battery - Redesignate as Long Range Precision Fires under a Multi-Domain Task Force (Reg Force 384) Work with RCAF RPAS Squadron (Reg Force 300) 2 Reg Force Firing Batteries 2 to 6 Reserve Firing Batteries
Air Defence - GBAD-CRAM RCA Joint with RCAF and RCN. Reg Force. Full time Sensors. Highly automated firing batteries. Reserve sensor operators.
Artillery - Stand down the Brigade Group Structure and emphasise Battle Groups and Combat Teams. Concentrate Reg Force in a single Arty Brigade with all the CS and GS Regiments. Reserve Force to supply Firing Troops/Batteries.
Sold!I'll meet you part way on the "Artillery" element. Assuming we're talking about Reg F CMBGs;
Reduce the CMBG's Close Support regiments to the following;
1. a hybrid regimental headquarters that has a Reg F CO and FSCC capability, and a hybrid regimental command post and support capability;
2. a complete Reg F FOO Bty with FSCCs and FOOs/JTACs;
3. a complete Reg F, six-gun, gun battery;
4. two complete Res F six-gun, gun batteries;
5. a complete Res F STA battery; and
6. the Res F remainder of the regimental headquarters and support capability.
All remaining full time PYs, (probably just under one half - let's say 250 out of 550) go to the Arty brigade for repurposing.
The rationale here is quite simple. As long as you have a battle group concept, each battle group needs to train on a regular basis and deploy with its FOO/JTACs and also have a battle group FSCC all of which come from the CS regiment. So the FOO/JTAC Bty must remain with the brigade and if the brigade is full-time then this Bty needs to be full-time as well.
Similarly, we do not generally deploy battle groups in isolation. We typically deploy battle groups with a supervising bde gp headquarters so that the battle group can concentrate on the tactical operations while the bde HQ focuses on the bigger picture including the integration of a multitude of enablers and other support. This means the bde HQ cannot be just tossed aside. They need to be retained and need to train regularly and deploy with their FSCC elements which comes from the CS regiments.
In order to keep the FOOs current they need to regularly train with at least one gun battery. In addition you need one Roto 0 battery available to deploy with the brigade. Finally one needs to keep current on gun line practices/doctrine and provide a career path focused on CS functions.
With the reduced size of the full-time component of the CS regiment you can reduce much of its support structure.
Everyone else can be reservists organized into fully equipped batteries in a way to be able to form additional CS batteries for subsequent rotos or to mobilize to a full sized regiment if required.
Note that if you do organize like this, then the artillery brigade does not need to concern itself with any CS functions such as FOOs, JTACs or FSCC resources at the bde or below level. It can concentrate on fire delivery systems, long range STA capabilities and integrating/coordinating ground based fire resources with sensors and delivery systems from other agencies.
In short while "brigading" artillery resources may sound like an efficiency, it is not because of the need for FOO/JTAC and FSCC capabilities to remain close to and involved with the brigade/battle groups on a frequent basis. That requires at least some fires resources to be close as well.
Ideally, if everybody does their part right . . .
Does "everybody" include the enemy?
I'm not sure what concept you are searching for.Armed Reconnaissance? Is that the concept I am searching for?
Surveillance of the national territory can be an unarmed, civilian function. However, surveillance, inevitably leaves holes which need to be patched. The patching is done by recce. And the recce element is better armed both for self defence and for the ability to influence the situation. It also needs to be able to communicate to concentrate available forces if the situation demands more than the recce element has on hand. The ability to reach back to heavier ordnance in a timely fashion.
Equally Armed Recce maintains a screening function to disrupt approaching enemy concentrations. It also controls the lines of approach.
And it can link up with neighbours and allies.
Would we get what we needed if we concentrated on ISR with a strong Armed Recce element? Would it be useful if we could maintain a three service armed reaction capability that could respond in as timely a fashion as the national SAR system? Or the NORAD system?
Once we can demonstrate domestic value, a higher domestic profile, then I believe you will see more support that will permit overseas operations.
Neither was I. What I'm saying though is that as long as we have the words "Russia" and "China" and "full spectrum" and "deterrence" in our defence policy then it behooves us to determine what our role in that scenario is and build an appropriate doctrine for it. If our contribution is to only supply a liaison officer to Brussels then lets be honest enough to say that. On the other hand, our commitment to Latvia's Enhanced Forward Presence makes it pretty darn clear we are committed to full spectrum deterrence by the highest level of our government.I'm not thinking about fielding a division. I am thinking first and foremost about what it will take to react to threats to the homeland. Once that is done then we can start thinking about recreating divisions, despatching Expeditionary Forces and making allied Armies.
The geography of Canada dictates that homeland is an air and sea (and Ranger) function. What the Army needs are deployable assets, relevant equipment and support facilities to enable QRF forces against incursions.So my first priority is surveillance, the second is rapid reaction. And the scope of reaction should range from SAR, to HA/DART, to armed response from air, sea and land. The land response needs to be co-ordinated with the RCAF to meet that timeliness. And I fully agree that rapid reaction into the Arctic is no time for Ad Hocery. That is the first thing that we should be able to do. Not the last thing.
With respect to the Navy, ships are not a QRF vehicle. Having a ship-rider force is a waste of resources. Training for the eventuality - okay. The light brigade can send the odd platoon out for training but as a standing force - no.Once we get that sorted then we can consider rapid response elements on board Her Majesty's Canadian Ships.
One of our problems in Canada is that we can't get our taxpayers to understand the value of vaccinations and wearing masks during a pandemic. Much of our population is uninformed (unless its about Justin Bieber or the latest hockey score). The best public education campaigns our governments put together fail dismally because the public doesn't listen and doesn't care - not just about the military but about many essential issues.Then we can look at what we can do with those deployable assets.
Then we can look at what dedicated Expeditionary Force we are willing and able to buy to despatch overseas.
One of our big problems in Canada, I believe, is that we give our taxpayers little reason to understand the value of a national defence force. Saying that it is not worthwhile trying domestically because we are so few and the place is so big, we can't help you. In the meantime please send money so that I can go to Cyprus, Latvia, Germany, and travel the US.
The only way we can demonstrate domestic value is through a domestic defence manufacturing capability - jobs. I have zero confidence that the public in general understand the nuance of working with our ally in NORAD from working with our allies in NATO. Both essentially guard against the same enemy and have roughly the same likelihood of being invoked.Once we can demonstrate domestic value, a higher domestic profile, then I believe you will see more support that will permit overseas operations.
Three record fire seasons, the most disastrous flood in Canadian history (Calgary) and a bunch of other floods, the ice storm, and sorting out care homes during the great plague wasn't even enough, clearly.
Yeah, we're pretty much screwed from that POV.
The problem with most domestic activations is the public - particularly urban - and media see a bunch of unarmed folks in funny looking clothes and some trucks (maybe the odd plane) being nice and helpful, and once the event is over they disappear. If they think about the matter at all, the public doesn't translate that image with calls for billions in modern, expensive high-tech equipment. None of the recent activations for fires, floods or Covid was seen compelling enough to any of the political parties to lift national defence off the back pages of their platforms.
The Canadian public holds onto this nostalgic view of Chapter VI peacekeeping as our natural role in the world. It's nice, and helpful, and relatively inexpensive. That, and the whole 'the US will protect us - who's going to invade us, we're nice'.
Neither was I. What I'm saying though is that as long as we have the words "Russia" and "China" and "full spectrum" and "deterrence" in our defence policy then it behooves us to determine what our role in that scenario is and build an appropriate doctrine for it. If our contribution is to only supply a liaison officer to Brussels then lets be honest enough to say that. On the other hand, our commitment to Latvia's Enhanced Forward Presence makes it pretty darn clear we are committed to full spectrum deterrence by the highest level of our government.
That, in short, means we need to develop a doctrine for that role and a possible expansion of it. That does not mean that you do not develop a doctrine for the defence of Canada. In fact its absolutely essential that there is one. In fact many parts of the doctrine might overlap or be common to both.
Economy of effort and complexity of training would indicate that you should concentrate your equipment and training efforts on the most complex and most likely. It's easier to step back from being prepared for a complex scenario to a simpler one rather than vice versa. Where possible and where resources permit you can create a separate force for each role. Resources availability is not a strong suit for the CAF and as a result your forces will need to be capable of primary and secondary employment.
The geography of Canada dictates that homeland is an air and sea (and Ranger) function. What the Army needs are deployable assets, relevant equipment and support facilities to enable QRF forces against incursions.
In fact, I have a pretty hard time imagining any incursion that can't be met by a long range strike. About the only thing that might need a ground force is if they seize a local settlement and hold hostages while they set up early warning radars. That's more a special forces operation but only after a serious political negotiating campaign to get them out.
Should we have a force that can bring ground combat power to bear? Sure. We're already a winter wonderland and all of our troops are trained in winter warfare (or at least we were back in the '70s and I presume they still are). There are clear peculiarities for operating in the Arctic that we don't have as a big problem down south in the winter - communications, distances and lack of routes, lack of cover, and the biggie - supply and support. That's all equipment and facility based. The basic organization and fighting skills don't vary much from our standard winter warfare training.
All of the troops that we need can easily be sources from CANSOFCOM or, if a bigger force is needed, from a single Reg F light brigade organized and trained in full spectrum warfare but properly equipped and occasionally exercised in Arctic warfare. If you wish to add a few Res F Arctic Response Companies - okay too.
With respect to the Navy, ships are not a QRF vehicle. Having a ship-rider force is a waste of resources. Training for the eventuality - okay. The light brigade can send the odd platoon out for training but as a standing force - no.
One of our problems in Canada is that we can't get our taxpayers to understand the value of vaccinations and wearing masks during a pandemic. Much of our population is uninformed (unless its about Justin Bieber or the latest hockey score). The best public education campaigns our governments put together fail dismally because the public doesn't listen and doesn't care - not just about the military but about many essential issues.
They leave foreign policy to their elected governments. We've had some dreadful governments - Chretien and Trudeau I'm looking at you - but also some that understood the military's role in projecting foreign presence amongst our allies - Martin and Harper.
The only way we can demonstrate domestic value is through a domestic defence manufacturing capability - jobs. I have zero confidence that the public in general understand the nuance of working with our ally in NORAD from working with our allies in NATO. Both essentially guard against the same enemy and have roughly the same likelihood of being invoked.
Our biggest public relations victory is the continued belief in our military as peacekeepers which is essentially a deployed operations situation. The fact that peacekeeping is now much more robust is merely a sign of the times.
Sorry. I don't buy your position. The best way to prepare for homeland defence, IMHO, is in strong, credible participation with our allies where our efforts are seen and appreciated and buy us international brownie points and a voice at the table.
As I've said before I think we do ourselves a disservice by posting our troops to various 'Gulags' around the country, mainly to be close to training areas, which has the effect of keeping the troops well out of the public eye.
This is very tactical.
Meanwhile, in places like the UK, they have barracks in cities and near other urban concentrations (Hownslow Bks, Edinburgh Castle/Redford Bks anyone?) where they are very much in the public eye. When they need to train they hop in buses and travel to Wales, or wherever.
For example, in Norway I recall watching the local infantry unit doing their version of the BFT, which took them down the main street, and people came out to clap and urge them on while handing them pop, for example.
This has its problems of course, as the size of the Monday morning charge parades might testify, but in strategic terms the military is always directly intermingled and engaged with the civilian population of the country it serves.
This is a good thing, for both the military and the civilian population.
Not sure of the overall magnitude (how many Regular personnel will remain in urbanish areas), but hasn't there been a move to what're being referred to as IIRC "superbases" in the UK, with mooted disconnection from the public, etc.?Meanwhile, in places like the UK, they have barracks in cities and near other urban concentrations (Hownslow Bks, Edinburgh Castle/Redford Bks anyone?) where they are very much in the public eye. When they need to train they hop in buses and travel to Wales, or wherever.
How much of that do PRes units currently do? Might just be in the wrong place, at the wrong time, but I think I've seen personnel out and about maybe three times in the last decade, not counting parades, on an island with at least six PRes locations (Bay Street, Ashton, Comms out by Naden, MALAHAT, Nanaimo, and Courtenay) and a gaggle of units.For example, in Norway I recall watching the local infantry unit doing their version of the BFT, which took them down the main street, and people came out to clap and urge them on while handing them pop, for example.