How capable is the RCN?

[Infanteer]

If you want to expand NTOG it needs to leave the RCN and join SOF or become its own trade.

Why would we do that?  CANSOFCOM isn't an orphanage for anyone with a C8 and some hands and feet skills, and naval boarding is not a SOF mission.  Maritime counter-terrorism is, but these two are apples and oranges.

 

[Donald H]

An even more dangerous situation developing with Turkey because "An injury to one,..............." doesn't apply. As to Canadian or Turkish ships coming out on top? The biggest consideration would likely be 'who shoots first'? Even Argentina was capable of sinking HMS Sheffield.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

OGB, ya those were the days.

Wondering about your opinion.  Should we have built another Asterix and used the USNS and RFA examples and went with more civilian crewing on these platforms ?

I certainly think so, two Resolve class and two Kingston class AOR's with one of each on both coasts would give the navy huge flexibility and very good way to train Merchant sailors to command levels to take on future roles as ships pilots and the like.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

OGB, ya those were the days.

Wondering about your opinion.  Should we have built another Asterix and used the USNS and RFA examples and went with more civilian crewing on these platforms ?

Sorry I didn't answer sooner ... long work day today.

My answer: Yes! Absolutely. We are in the business of fighting wars, not the gas station / convenience store business. Civilian mariners are a lot more capable than we are at operating ships  that require only engineering and seamanship with a lot less personnel. Similarly, civilian aviators are adequately capable of providing - with a much smaller footprint - an onboard helicopter capability for vertreps. All they need is a small military logistics cell to do the paper work and keep track of goods/finances provided to the fleet.

That's been my view for a long time. If the American and the Brits can make it work, why not us?

I know the counter argument has always been: "But since we are military, we can put ourselves in more dangerous situations than civilians so we use our AORs quite differently than the US and the UK." 

First of all: Tell that to the British RFA's that went down to fight the Falkland wars. They were right in the middle of the friggin action, civilian crew and all. Second how much of how we used our AORs is simply a factor of the fact that we (the RCN) are the ones crewing them as opposed to actually fulfilling an operational requirement that we cannot do without. As far as I am concerned, we can run the "command team accommodation" duties put on the AOR's from any other type of command ship, be it a Destroyer or something else we could acquire if we weren't stuck having to crew and operate the AOR's - such as a multipurpose helicopter/landing/humanitarian vessel (rings a bell with anyone?).

 

[FSTO]

I know the counter argument has always been: "But since we are military, we can put ourselves in more dangerous situations than civilians so we use our AORs quite differently than the US and the UK." 

I'm sure glad we never had a shooting war with that sort of attitude. Putting our AOR's in harms way for no apparent gain is nothing to base a strategy on.

If I had a magic wand we'd have 4 to 6 Astrix class AOR's (operated by civilians) and 4 Mistrals for HDAR/Sea Control Ops.

 

[Underway]

I find it intersting that the East Coast sailors are talking about how NTOG doesn't really do its job.  NTOG since its formation has been much more active with the West Coast fleet in drug busts and boarding actions. I agree that some criticisms are valid.  It does take sailors away from their trades. And despite their best efforts NTOG is a friction point on the ships during deployment when they are not boarding people.

If NTOG value is an issue its that it idea may have missed the timing for when it would have been truely valuable.  With the return to great power competition some anti-terrorism drug interdiction missions are on the back burner.

As for NST, when they showed up on my deployment they were professional and excellently trained for their job.  Took it much more serious then the ships company did.  And they allowed the ships company to properly relax as it took all those FP spots out of the dutywatch rotation.  There were also friction points but that was more due to sorting out CoC issues with their IC and not something that really was a criticism of the concept.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Why would we do that?  CANSOFCOM isn't an orphanage for anyone with a C8 and some hands and feet skills, and naval boarding is not a SOF mission.  Maritime counter-terrorism is, but these two are apples and oranges.

Infanteer with the money answer as always!  Certain Navy  folk seem to have this idea that anyone with a rifle should be someone elses job.

They also don't understand the difference between what NTOG does and Maritime Counter-Terrorism.  Using JTF-2 for boarding actions against wooden Dhows is a colossal waste of a pretty scarce resource.

I find it intersting that the East Coast sailors are talking about how NTOG doesn't really do its job.  NTOG since its formation has been much more active with the West Coast fleet in drug busts and boarding actions. I agree that some criticisms are valid.  It does take sailors away from their trades. And despite their best efforts NTOG is a friction point on the ships during deployment when they are not boarding people.

A lot of this is just whinging though.  It's the classic Riders, Day Workers, Shift Workers gripes that never go away.

"NTOG doesn't stand watches" ... "NTOG takes up too much space" ... "NTOG doesn't do anything" blahblahblah

If NTOG value is an issue its that it idea may have missed the timing for when it would have been truely valuable.  With the return to great power competition some anti-terrorism drug interdiction missions are on the back burner.

I think people forget why NTOG was created. My understanding is the way the RCN treated NBP in the 90s and 00s was borderline negligent and we should be thankful that no incidents occurred where someone was killed due to inadequate training. 

As things can always go South quickly:

https://youtu.be/Woz2VraNRKY

This new way is far better and is the way of the future. The RCN is just playing catchup to every other Navy who already has this capability.

I also think the unit can potentially be used for other tasks as well.  They already have been used for SFCB but they could also be attached to a CJTF, they could be used to guard a Controlled Access Zone or provide enhanced force protection. 

As for NST, when they showed up on my deployment they were professional and excellently trained for their job.  Took it much more serious then the ships company did.  And they allowed the ships company to properly relax as it took all those FP spots out of the dutywatch rotation.  There were also friction points but that was more due to sorting out CoC issues with their IC and not something that really was a criticism of the concept.

 

I don't doubt they take it more seriously or are better at it  than the Ship's Company.  That's not a hard metric to really beat though.  I find the way the RCN conceptualizes FP strange.  It's heavy on legalese, leaves COs with limited options and I don't find the levels particularly useful. 

There is little flexibility in it and a lot of the time, it's a meaningless manpower suck that simply fulfills a checklist rather than analyzing what the actual threats are and allocating resources accordingly. 

What I would optimally like to see is NTOG assume FP duties if there is a threat that is actually warranted. You've got the personnel there so use them.  NTOG should also develop a designated marksman and crew-served weapon capability that could also be utilized for enhanced FP which I believe is in the early stages of development atm. 

Oh yah, ditch the .50 cal and go with a C6 for FP.  .50 cal is complete overkill, way higher chance of collateral damage in an actual FP scenario.  It also has a rate of fire that is about half what a C6 is so you get about half the rounds landing in your beaten zone that you would with a C6.  That's kind of a big deal in a small boat attack scenario when you might be bobbing around in the water and accuracy becomes a problem.

.50 cal also isn't portable.  Single 2 person C6 team in the hangar would be able to move rapidly to any part of the upper deck and could be held in the FPO's back pocket for use as required. 

Sure, if there is a requirement, crew .50 cals but very often there is little need and it isn't a very flexible solution. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

When arming the CCG comes up, I think a couple of .50cals on the CCG ships so they can support dedicated boarding parties provided by the navy or RCMP would be the way to go. To protect the party on the transit and to provide authority.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I think it's pretty hard for NTOG to do the job they applied and trained for when we don't have the ROEs or mission parameters for them to do boardings. Not their fault they aren't being used, and the guys we had were really good about pitching in where they could with repairs and maintenance when we needed it. It was frustrating to have them take up valuable bunk space and not do boardings, but I blamed the big giant heads and not the operators (who were all really good guys that were really frustrated to sit around twiddling their thumbs as we putted around ignoring legitimate targets). My  :2c: is they shouldn't be part of the mission team without the ROEs and intentions, as that particular scenario lead to a few popping smoke and going back to their trade, or hanging up the uniform.

 

[FSTO]

I think people forget why NTOG was created. My understanding is the way the RCN treated NBP in the 90s and 00s was borderline negligent and we should be thankful that no incidents occurred where someone was killed due to inadequate training. 

As things can always go South quickly:

https://youtu.be/Woz2VraNRKY

This new way is far better and is the way of the future. The RCN is just playing catchup to every other Navy who already has this capability.

I was there during OP APOLLO and to tell you the truth we had no idea what the hell we would do if there was an actual firefight on board a suspect vessel. When I got to CFFSE Sea Div in 04 I tried to get authority to use Sim Ammo for training but was shot down. The genesis for NTOG was when CFFSE had a visit from a couple of lads dressed in MEC outdoor gear, scruffy beards and wearing Oakley. I invited them to watch our NBP "Training". After they stopped laughing, I asked if they would be so kind as to write an assessment to send up the chain to RCN HQ. The rest is history.

I also think the unit can potentially be used for other tasks as well.  They already have been used for SFCB but they could also be attached to a CJTF, they could be used to guard a Controlled Access Zone or provide enhanced force protection.

 
Back to OP APOLLO. We in Algonquin had White and Blue NBParties. Since Alg could only sail for a couple of weeks before needing a rest, one team would be the on watch NBP while the other team was with its departments (In my case the DeckO standing bridge watch). After the port visit the other team would be the on call boarding team and the other group would return to their departments. It worked very well during the deployments and neither team got burnt out.
We were very busy intercepting go fasts and dhows during that OP.

 

[Grimey]

I was there during OP APOLLO and to tell you the truth we had no idea what the hell we would do if there was an actual firefight on board a suspect vessel. When I got to CFFSE Sea Div in 04 I tried to get authority to use Sim Ammo for training but was shot down. The genesis for NTOG was when CFFSE had a visit from a couple of lads dressed in MEC outdoor gear, scruffy beards and wearing Oakley. I invited them to watch our NBP "Training". After they stopped laughing, I asked if they would be so kind as to write an assessment to send up the chain to RCN HQ. The rest is history.

 
Back to OP APOLLO. We in Algonquin had White and Blue NBParties. Since Alg could only sail for a couple of weeks before needing a rest, one team would be the on watch NBP while the other team was with its departments (In my case the DeckO standing bridge watch). After the port visit the other team would be the on call boarding team and the other group would return to their departments. It worked very well during the deployments and neither team got burnt out.
We were very busy intercepting go fasts and dhows during that OP.

FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!

 

[Pelorus]

If I had a magic wand we'd have 4 to 6 Astrix class AOR's (operated by civilians) and 4 Mistrals for HDAR/Sea Control Ops.

This plan would of course also involve reorienting the majority of the Canadian Army to be a primarily amphibious operations force to fill those Mistrals, right?  :stirpot:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Van Doos did do so operational exercises from the French ones. We almost got the two built for Russia, I really wish we had, the time was right with our 280's dying and crew complements being roughly the same. I think we would find them highly useful ships for a lot of stuff we do and give us new opportunities as well.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ0nZwXg6WI

 

[Navy_Pete]

FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!

The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.

Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake.

In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.

 

[Grimey]

The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.

Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake.

In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.

For Op Apollo on ALG, we had no embarked helairdet and left with no certified flight deck (we used a RN Sea King for that once in theatre.). We had full REMAR for MSE and were allocated a handful of training bunks.  HUR only had a skeleton crew at that time and threw bodies at us, along with the school. 

The NBP equipment was incredibly basic.  Blue nomex coveralls and oil skin ball caps.  We tried buying jungle boots in Guam at the PX.  That didn’t work out.  The sea boots at the time were the first generation that replaced the ankle cripplers.  Non breathable with an insulated liner.  Great for the GOO in July and August.  This was 18 years ago, I’m assuming the kit has improved somewhat since then.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

For Op Apollo on ALG, we had no embarked helairdet and left with no certified flight deck (we used a RN Sea King for that once in theatre.). We had full REMAR for MSE and were allocated a handful of training bunks.  HUR only had a skeleton crew at that time and threw bodies at us, along with the school. 

The NBP equipment was incredibly basic.  Blue nomex coveralls and oil skin ball caps.  We tried buying jungle boots in Guam at the PX.  That didn’t work out.  The sea boots at the time were the first generation that replaced the ankle cripplers.  Non breathable with an insulated liner.  Great for the GOO in July and August.  This was 18 years ago, I’m assuming the kit has improved somewhat since then.

I remember that day on ALG with the RN Sea King. A bunch of us aircrew got RHIB’d over from OTT to help with safety and to act as hoisting dummies for the Brits. I then got my only flight in an RN Sea King, when they returned us to OTTat the end of the evolution.

 

[FSTO]

FSTO, I was your A4 for that deployment and can confirm that we collectively did very well in balancing NBP and departmental duties, especially considering a substantial portion of both teams (MSE dept) were involved with cruise engines change-outs during the RAMP.  I do remember wondering what would happen if things went south quickly during a boarding.  At least our two suspects came quietly when we intercepted their go-fast!

Those were they days weren't they?

 

[FSTO]

The 280s had the luxury of a lot more bunks (think they topped out at roughly 310-320); with the frigates you are really fighting for billets for core departmental work once you get an air dept, secret squirrels and a few others fighting for the 250 bunks. For ref had 51 for the MSE dept (plus myself), where normally we had about 60 for standard sailing (compared to around 70 we would have on ATH/IRO). It was workable, but there were times when our entire department (on/off watch) was involved in different concurrent evolutions. Also meant we got into the refs and had some positions with the bare min (ie had no FFs/Helo Crash rescue HTs for fueling, so it was an attack team leader trained MS and maybe a bosn manning the hose for the fueling). The white board in the tech office to fill the positions was pretty key, and also other depts filling spots that were typically MSE previously (but no longer specifically required) was critical. Sea training had gone through this exercise when they drew it up, but they had some assumptions on our personnel level, and we deployed below that due to lack of bunks.

Worked fine when we had no issues, but had a few close calls due to miscommunication/inexperience along the way. In general, suspect we'll keep putting more and more junior folks in positions like that, and re-evaluate when something happens to see if that was a mistake.

In that context, that's why the NTOG coming on board is an issue. Can't remember what the standard team size is (maybe a dozen?) but it's tight enough that any rider means someone in the core crew isn't sailing, and best of luck carrying any trainees that aren't qualified for a watch position somewhere. My  :2c: don't have them on board 'in case of' but maybe have them on some kind of notice to move, and if it looks like you'll need them forward deploy them to join a ship in theatre for when you actually have the ROEs and intent to board. Otherwise they don't add anything to the mission, and better for the org to use those bunks for junior sailors that need sea time doing their prime job. Or alternately, use them to actually do some soft boardings; there are usually more then a few sketchy ships anywhere you go where there would be actual value to check them out, and that's more useful then having them sit around trying to keep the team engaged with daily training exercises and PT.

Doesn't quite mesh with the drive to minimum man the ships! That was one of the failings of the CPFs that there was zero room for training bunks.
I wonder what sort of extra room the CSC's will have for training bunks, riders, etc? Or will that just be another lesson relearned.

 

[Weinie]

According to the link below, complement of 157 with room for 208.

https://www.baesystems.com/en-uk/product/global-combat-ship

 

[Weinie]

Question, not being familiar with Halifax/Esquimalt.

With the CSC coming in at 50 feet longer and 15 feet wider than the Halifax class, will this cause berthing concerns in either of these two locations?