Infantry of Tomorrow

[OldSolduer]

Especially for those in their 70s who want to soldier on!

Thanks.....but no thanks. ;D

 

[Gorgo]

Quick question:  Why is it the infantry sort of runs on a 3 x 3 x 3 x 3 system these days (3 squads per platoon, 3 platoons per company, 3 companies per battalion, 3 battalions per brigade)?  Is using a 4 x 4 x 4 x 4 system a little too cumbersome?

Just curious.

 

[a_majoor]

"Square" systems did exist for centuries (four platoons, four companies etc.), but fell out of fashion in the early 20th century. Several explanations have been given, including span of command (particularly since the area covered by platoons and companies was increasing due to improved rifles and area weapons) and the idea that a 3 subunit formation could operate "2 Up" with 66% of the firepower committed and only 33% held back while a "Square" formation would have 50% of the firepower out of the fight in a "2 Up" formation.

First cut at the answer.

 

[Infanteer]

"Square" systems did exist for centuries (four platoons, four companies etc.), but fell out of fashion in the early 20th century. Several explanations have been given, including span of command (particularly since the area covered by platoons and companies was increasing due to improved rifles and area weapons) and the idea that a 3 subunit formation could operate "2 Up" with 66% of the firepower committed and only 33% held back while a "Square" formation would have 50% of the firepower out of the fight in a "2 Up" formation.

First cut at the answer.

Much of this deals with the evolution of European Infantry Battalions.

Battalions were organized with 10 Companies until the end of the 20th century.  I'd have to check some references, but sometime around the end of the 19th century, "platoons" came into being as a tactical formation; I'm not exactly sure when they merged companies and went from 10 to 4 or what the rationale was off the top of my head, but span of control may have been one.  By WWI, platoons were being specialized into functions such as bombing, machine gunning, etc, etc.  At some point just prior to or during the Second World War (I haven't identified the date yet, but am looking), the British (and therefore Canada) adopted a Battalion structure that in principle still exists today.

We don't really use a "3x3x3x3" system - there are 3 platoons in a company, but the 3 rifle companies of a battalion are matched by Cbt Spt and Admin Coy.  As well, we are at three companies because the fourth was dropped at some point in the 80s/90s.  And Brigades have 3 Infantry Battalions, but for many periods they only had 2.  And brigades have a host of other units as well - a Brigade Commander today has 7 subordinate units.  Other armies (such as the Germans) have utilized different systems in the past.

The USMC has traditionally employed a 3 +1 system with its Infantry units.  3 Squads and Support element in a Platoon, 3 Platoons and a Spt Platoon in a Company, etc, etc all the way to Regiment.

The fact of the matter is that there are no "rules of 3" or "rules of 4" that are the best way for organizing the infantry; we likely do it as:

1.  Militaries are by nature creatures of habit; and

2.  As a profession, we seem uninterested in questioning "common wisdom" at times.

A British study was done on the "Rule of 4" to see if it was the optimal form of organization for the Infantry - the study found that there was no concrete proof that the Rule of 4 was superior to any other way of organization.  However, apparently some senior Officer, relying on "common wisdom", decreed that the Rule of 4 was optimal, so the findings of the study were ignored.

Ultimately, TO&Es and ORBATs are administrative tools to add some predictability to defence management and not real tools on how to fight better.  "A" staff need them to know how many bodies they need and where they go while "Q" staff need them to know how much beans and bullets are required and where they go.  Once exposed to serious fighting, unit strengths at all levels vary wildly and ad hoc groupings are the norm.

Second cut at the answer.

 

[Kirkhill]

Jumping in the pool:

Muzzle loading era - battalions organized in 10 coys - 1 Grenadier on the Right, 1 Light on the Left and 8 Line coys in between
platoons were scattered along the line amongst the coys ( ie 1 platoon would have some troops in 1 Coy, some in 2, some in 3...) so as to supply continuous fire all along the line.  (Redcoat by Richard Holmes IIRC).

Single shot breech loaders - Rorke's Drift era - higher rate of fire with the new rifles permitted firing by ranks all along the line (Front Rank Fire, Reload, Rear Rank Fire, Reload, Front Rank Fire, Reload). 

Magazine loaded rifles - Lee Enfield - independent firing by soldiers in prone position - 4 large coys of 200 to 250 at the outbreak of WW1.

Coys reduced in size and number to man specialist elements like mortars and machine guns

Further specialization resulted in the resurrection of the platoon but as a standalone all-arms sub of the Company (Bayonet section, Bomber section (grenades), Rifle Grenade section, Lewis Gun section (machine gun).  Enemy swarmed by a large number of small units rather than overwhelmed by standing mass of troops.
ca 1917 - Vimy, Arras.

Lloyd George moves troops to Italian front to prevent Haig killing more young lads - forcing Haig to thin out his remaining battalions.  Battalions start moving in column of threes.    (Consequence of Lloyd's action - Germans strengthened by bodies released from the Russian front by Lenin encouraged to attack both in the West and Italy.  Brits died on both fronts)

Noteworthy that part of the Canadian Corps utility and success was that it did not thin out its Battalions and used its personnel to keep a Corps of large battalions up to strength rather than creating an Army of smaller battalions.

Sometime in the 1920s the Brits formally recognized the WW1 expedient of marching in 3s.

Canadians, Royal Air Force and other commonwealth elements continued to drill in 4s up to the 1940s.

Cut 3  - Alzheimers, rumour and innuendo.

 

[Infanteer]

Kirkhill has the all the basics of infantry evolution.

Of note

Noteworthy that part of the Canadian Corps utility and success was that it did not thin out its Battalions and used its personnel to keep a Corps of large battalions up to strength rather than creating an Army of smaller battalions.

The debate to keep the Canadian Corps under the previous, largely square, organization (4 coys/bn, 4 bns/Bde, 3 Bdes/Div, 4 Divs in the Corps) is an interesting one.  On the political side, IIRC, Currie wanted to keep the fighting power of the CEF concentrated.  From the tactical standpoint, the more robust formations appeared to have suited the type of fighting that was going on.  I have not read enough of the decision to know what promted Currie to turn down the ability to reduce Div sizes, create additional Divs and form a Canadian Army but I believe it had something to do with keeping units at 100% if possible.  I believe the Australians, to keep 5 Divisions in their Corps, resorted to reducing Brigades from a square organization to a triangular one.

This debate also surfaced in WWII, with the decision to go with a two Corps Army as opposed to one big Corps.  I feel that decision was the right one as it allowed Canadian forces to contribute to separate theaters (1st Corps in Italy and 2nd Corps in NW Europe until Mar 45), it recognized that all Canadian elements under a single Corps would have been unwieldy in the type of warfare being fought, and 1st Canadian Army was able to take the field and provide command of other allied formations.  Having a Commander at the Army level was important for Canada in light of our significant contribution.

That being said, large formations are not always the answer.  The German Army favoured smaller formations for a variety of reasons and some experienced German Generals made interesting comments about the very large NATO divisions in Germany during the Cold War; arguing for smaller ones.  As well, some historical analysis points to larger formations being less efficient; regardless of the size, a survey of Second World War Battles points to Divisions tending to only employ somewhere around 8 sub-units on operations; I believe this was attributed to span of control and what a formation commander could confidently employ at any one time.  It could be argued that it would be better to have 2 smaller Divisions of 12 sub-units (where employment is maximized) vice one Division of 24 sub-units where only 33% of the formation tends to be employed.

 

[Old Sweat]

I believe Currie opted to retain the existing Corps organization because of the difficulty staffing the extra headquarters in the two corps army. The Canadian Corps had one corps, four division and 12 brigade headquarters and fielded 48 infantry battalions. An army would have required one army, two corps, six division and 18 brigade headquarters to field 54 infantry battalions, or a net increase of six battalions and one army, one corps, two division and six brigade headquarters.

Now, I won't speculate what the modern Canadian Army would do with a similar opportunity.

 

[vonGarvin]

Now, I won't speculate what the modern Canadian Army would do with a similar opportunity.

More HQs to study the problem, that's what would happen.

And I've seen it happen.  In 08, in Kandahar, I sat through a briefing in which some guy (officer) talked about how for the next roto, the tank squadron would go from 3 troops to 2, and those 16 PYs would go to his HQ.


:

 

[Kirkhill]

You know TV, you just gave me a thought as to WHY the Brits may have started moving in 3s vs 4s.

If your battalion of 1000 is pared down to 750 there is no easily seen reason for reducing the number of files from 4 to 3.  It would just mean that your column is 25% shorter and so your battalion shows up at the FUP 25% sooner.

And in that is the germ of an idea:

World War 1 is notorious for the tyranny of the clock.  Everything moved to a schedule that once initiated could not be varied due to the poor communications. 

The impact on planning if all battalions in an Army area moved past a particular cross road 25% sooner than planned would have been interesting in the extreme.

I wonder if the 3 rank system wasn't instituted to stretch out the battalions so that their movements would correspond to the Movement Tables used by the Staff in planning?

Alternately, perhaps it was a form of keeping the Germans unaware that the battalions were being thinned? I am guessing that it would be easier to see that battalions on the march were getting shorter, when observed from a distance, than it would be to see that the files were only 3 men deep instead of 4.

 

[a_majoor]

That is the most interesting speculation yet.

The tyranny of the clock was probably "the" key factor in everyone's planning during WWI, from the railway mania of the Germans to the massive artillery programs the British forces used to hammer the enemy. (An infamous example is the Battle of the Somme, several British divisions actually reached their objecitves and could see clear ground ahead, but were denied permission to advance since the artillery timetable could not be adjusted. See Martin Van Crevald: Command in War for details).

Now the ability to move 25% faster would be a huge advantage; Fredrick the Great won lots of battles through the simple expedient of changing the marching speed from the traditional 60 paces/min to our modern 120 paces/min.

However, I don't think cause and effect is really that simple; perhaps the most reasonable explanation for changing from Square to Triangular formations was simply armies were running out of manpower. Part of Canada's ability to maintain larger formations was political; the almost fanatical insistance that Canadians must fight together rather than be spread out among the British formations (indeed, in 1914 it was thought [by the British] the best way to deal with the Colonial drafts arriving in the UK would be to send soldiers as individual replacements to existing British units).

For tomorrow's army I think the USMC 3+1 idea has many advantages, particularly since platoon level weapons are becoming as powerful today as "battalion" level weapons were only a few decades ago. The +1 support sections/platoons/companies can group increadingly powerful weapons together for mass or disperse among the three subunits for greater flexibility depending on the situation. This includes ATGM's, mortars, automatic grenade launchers, tanks and so on.

 

[Gorgo]

Well, if we went to a 4 x 4 x 4 x 4 system, we'd get this:

Four squads of 4 men each for a section of 16.

Four sections of 16 men each for a platoon of 64 (plus platoon HQ of 4 to make 68).

Four platoons of 68 men each for a company of 272 (plus company HQ of around 8 to make 280).

Four companies of 280 men each for a battalion of 1120 (plus battalion HQ, combat support company and combat service support company personnel).

Four battalions of 1120 + BHQ/Cbt Sp Coy/Cbt Svc Sp Coy for a brigade of 4480 riflemen (and then tack on an armoured regiment, field artillery regiment, combat engineer regiment, tactical aviation squadron/battalion, light medical battalion, service battalion, military police company, intelligence platoon and brigade headquarters and signal squadron) . . .

Yeah, it would get pretty cumbersome. 

 

[Mountie]

How about a light infantry battalion organized on the 4x4 system like this:

How about 4 sections of 4 (present day US/UK fire team or Cdn assault group) + 4-man weapons section (1 GPMG team & Designated Marksman) & platoon HQ for a total of 24 men

4 x infantry platoons (4 x 24) + combat support platoon (2-4 60mm mortars, 2-4 Carl Gustavs and a sniper detachment) + HQ/CSS platoon for a company total of about 140-150 men

4 x rifle companies (4 x 140) + combat support company (4-8 81mm mortars, 4-8 Javelin ATGMs, recce platoon, signal platoon) + HQ/CSS company for a battalion total of about 850-900 men

 

[Infanteer]

Why the obsession with 4?  As I said above, TO&Es are administrative tools to determine where to put the bodies.  All the mental masturbation over whether to have 7, 8, 9, 10 or 12 men in a section with 4, 6, or 8 men in support is irrelevant to tactics or doctrine because:

1.  In a real battle, those numbers go out the door as casualties mount; and

2.  In a real battle, leaders will have to use whatever works after a quick combat estimate - if a platoon commander determines he needs a 15-man team and a 5-man team, then that's what he'll use, ORBAT be damned.

 

[Gorgo]

We're not obsessing with it.  We're just doing a theoretical exercise and learning a little history since, as others on this thread have noted, Canada used to work on a 4 x 4 system, mostly during World War One and the original Canadian Corps.

I'm an ex-administration clerk myself (these days, my trade forms part of the resource management support clerk group) and I've always been personally fascinated with TO&Es and how units can be built up.

And yes, you are right that things tend to get crazy and any sort of neat lines disappear as soon as the fecal matter hits the fan.  So chances are there that nothing we propose will ever see the light of day outside our imaginations.  Still, it is fun.  ;D

 

[Old Sweat]

If you want to get a glimpse of organizational chaos, take a look at the infantry battalion organization of the 1st Canadian Division on the Salisbury Plain before the formation moved to France. It was classic "Greatcoats On! Greatcoats Off!" I am not home, so I don't have access to the reference material, but the division changed from the eight company to the four "double" company organization and back and forth several times in a few months. Finally the four company model was adopted. Add to that, that the platoon as a fixed organization was a fairly new device, and you can imagine the confusion.

In the eight company battalion, the sub-units were commanded by either a major or a captain, usually four of each. Each company had two subalterns, a small headquarters and four sections of about 20-25 troops commanded by a sergeant with a couple of corporals. Imagine the fun of putting two together into a four platoon organization, and then taking it apart again, and then repeating the process and . . .

So what? I guess there are many models and just as many reasons why one is better than another.

 

[Infanteer]

We're not obsessing with it.  We're just doing a theoretical exercise and learning a little history since, as others on this thread have noted, Canada used to work on a 4 x 4 system, mostly during World War One and the original Canadian Corps.

Note the "4x4" system doesn't generally apply to the section level;  sections aren't made up of 4s, or multiples of it.  The only real "principle of 4" was 4 Companies in a Battalion and 4 Battalions in a Brigade.  Below company, the platoon and section were in a constant state of flux and above Divisions were set on 3 Brigades per Div.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Add to that, that the platoon as a fixed organization was a fairly new device, and you can imagine the confusion.

Notes from The RCR on the adoption of platoon organizations:

5 Jan 1917

Lieut. Col. HILL, D.S.O. and Major WILLETS attended the Divisional Training School in the morning for a demonstration of the new platoon organization.

April 1917

This was the first occasion on which the new platoon formation was used. It had been found that the platoon must be a self-contained unit with each branch of the infantry represented, This was deemed essential for trench to trench attack.

The platoon was divided into four sections and a platoon headquarters, a bombing section, Lewis Gun section, rifle and bayonet section and a rifle grenade section. In this manner practically any situation could be handled effectively on the spot and the success at Vimy certainly justified this contention.

This system originated from the French and was adopted by all.

The battalion went into action [with] 16 company officers and 632 other ranks. Thirteen officers and 290 other ranks became casualties.

May 1917

New Platoon Organization. 24. Proved its usefulness by the easy manner in which the organization of different raiding parties was carried out.

 

[ArmyRick]

I would not obsess over any one magic "number", that is pure theory. We nedd tactical but practical thinking!!!

There are several ways to organize a platoon and no one structure is going to be perfect. Also fighting in mechanized vehicles such as LAVIII or CCV in open country will differ from fighting in a thick dense jungle. Everybody gets this, I know that, just a friendly reminder.

The questions I think need asking to ones self when designing their customized battalion
1. What are the threats they will encounter/engage on ops? List from most likely to least likely.
2. What key weapons do I want at platoon, company and battalion level? Anti-armour assets, mortars, machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, IFV/APC, etc, etc. Remember your most likely threats first (and enemy if known, most likely actions and most dangerous actions to you)
3. How many of these support weapons do we need at each level? Remember support weapons gobble up ammo quickly and increases the logistics train required to support them.
4. The remainder are divided into assault elements (at least I recommend anyways). Can you combine the support weapons with assault elements? Up to you as an arm chair general, just remember the mission and most likely scenarios (platoon, company or battalion battles?). You can always adjust as required.
5. How are the assaulting sections broken down? 4 guys and you can't afford any casualties, 16 guys and the damn section commander is going crazy trying to control them. I reccommend between 8-12, it allows for casualties and still be able to carry on. This last one is based as 7 years as an infantry SGT, 6 years commanding a section.
6. How do you want the command structure broken down and who do you think should be responsible for what tasks?

Try putting these questions into place and not worry about the magic number 4, 6 or 7 1/2. Also you may have an assault elemnt of 8 guys and a GPMG section of 6. Do your thinking and planning (your estimate) of all the factors before deciding something.

 

[vonGarvin]

I like the structure of our platoons as they are.  As Infanteer pointed out, the sections are administrative groupings, but they can, in many cases, be left "untouched" to conduct their tasks.

But I would be loathe to base any groupings on vehicles, per se. 

So, that being said, the "command element" of a platoon I see as being only three: commander, 2IC and signaller.
Then there are the rifle sections, three of them, all with ten soldiers, including a commander and a 2IC (Sgt and MCpl)
Then there is the fourth "section", with six soldiers, including a commander and a 2IC (Sgt and MCpl).  This is a weapons' sections.


Of course, if the platoon is in LAV III APCs, then the sections would have to have a driver, CC and gunner.  And for the platoon commander, there is the "LAV Sgt", gunner and driver.  That only leaves 3 for the weapons' section detachment.  And if the op calls for no LAVs, then they group however.  If they use assault boats, then again, another grouping.

 

[a_majoor]

US Army's "Land Warrior" system is still not effective as far as the troops are concerned:

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/4215715

The Army's New Land Warrior Gear: Why Soldiers Don't Like It

After spending 15 years on R & D, the Pentagon is outfitting soldiers for a high-tech battlefield network designed to cut through the fog of war. Popular Mechanics tests out the high-tech package and discovers why America's wireless warriors think it will slow them down in Iraq.
BY NOAH SHACHTMAN

October 1, 2009 12:00 AM

Looking through the Land Warrior System's flip-down eyepiece, shown here being used by a member of the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, from Fort Lewis, Wash., is equivalent to viewing a 17-in. computer monitor. Along with maps and other information, the eyepiece displays the view through the lens of a video camera mounted on a soldier's M-4, enabling him to peer over walls in safety. The brigade, now deployed in Iraq, is the first unit to test the gear in combat.

There's a half-billion dollars invested in the gear hanging off the heads, chests and backs of the soldiers of Alpha company. Digital maps displayed on helmet-mounted eyepieces show the position of all the men in the unit as they surround a block of concrete buildings and launch their attacks. Instead of relying on the hand signals and shouted orders that most infantrymen use, Alpha company communicates via advanced, encrypted radio transmissions with a range of up to a kilometer. It's more information than any soldiers have ever had about their comrades and their surroundings.

But as Alpha kicks in doors, rounds up terror suspects and peals off automatic fire in deafening six-shot bursts, not one of the soldiers bothers to check his radio or look into the eyepiece to find his buddies on the electronic maps. "It's just a bunch of stuff we don't use, taking the place of useful stuff like guns," says Sgt. James Young, who leads a team of four M-240 machine-gunners perched on a balcony during this training exercise at Fort Lewis, Wash. "It makes you a slower, heavier target."

Since the late 1990s, the U.S. military has pushed hard to link every vehicle, every sensor and every soldier in a sprawling intranet for combat. The objective of this network-centric warfare: Boost battlefield communication and situational awareness -- making troops smarter, quicker and deadlier. Today, a big chunk of the combat vehicles and command posts have been wired up. But most soldiers on the ground still don't even have a radio.

Alpha's electronics package, known as the Land Warrior System, is designed to finally plug the infantryman into the battlefield network. These exercises in the shadow of Mount Rainier are the Army's most comprehensive test of the system yet -- a dry run before Alpha company and the rest of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment take Land Warrior to Iraq.

But on the eve of what should be the program's biggest success, support for Land Warrior is crumbling. In the halls of the Pentagon there's a pitched battle being waged over Land Warrior's long-term budget and its long-term future. Army program managers are questioning Land Warrior's most basic premise: Does every soldier need to be wired?

If the program is going to survive, it will need rave reviews from the field. But, at least on this crisp, sunny afternoon, Alpha doesn't seem all that happy with the gear. "I'm not a big fan, personally," says Pvt. Donald Starks, who's dripping with sweat after a morning of rehearsing house-to-house fighting in his Land Warrior rig.

The first, most obvious difference between the current suite of soldier equipment and Land Warrior is the flip-down eyepiece attached to the helmet. In it, an infantryman can see a map of the area, with his fellow troops marked by blue icons. (In the military, blue denotes friendly forces.) It's similar to a vehicle-mounted system, Blue Force Tracker, which has been credited with turbocharging the American push to Baghdad in 2003 and reducing friendly fire incidents in Iraq.

The Land Warrior System marks the first time that a soldier has been able to keep tabs on his buddies without monitoring them on the radio or keeping them in visual range. "We can track each other without saying a word," says Staff Sgt. Michael Wyatt as we squeeze into a Stryker fighting vehicle. The slender 5-ft. 3-in. Virginian ran convoy missions in Iraq for a year before joining Alpha company. Before that he spent seven years with the Marines. "All guys bitch and moan for a while about new gear," Wyatt says. "They'll get used to it."

If Land Warrior troops want to communicate verbally, they can use the radio headsets and noise-canceling, over-the-ear headphones that fit into every Kevlar helmet. A transmitter for a wireless network is on the soldier's body armor, broadcasting encrypted signals for up to a kilometer. There's also a lithium-ion battery pack, a GPS transponder and a paperback-size 400-MHz computer to run the whole system. The soldier operates the gear with a controller on his chest that's shaped like a gun grip or via buttons on his M-4 rifle.

It's not the only change to the weapon. Mounted on the rifle and connected to the rest of the systemis a digital sight that lets a soldier, in effect, see around corners; all he has to do is stick his gun out -- not his neck. The sight also serves as a long-range zoom, with 12x magnification. "It makes every rifleman a marksman," says Col. Richard Hansen, Land Warrior's project manager. Night vision and laser targeting, which once required clunky binoculars or attachments to the weapon, are now built in.

Many of the system's components were first suggested in 1991, long before network-centric war became a Pentagon buzzword. But putting the recommendations into action "has been more difficult than anybody thought," says retired Lt. Gen. Paul Kern, who oversaw Land Warrior as director of the Army Acquisition Corps from 1997 to 2001. By the end of the 1990s, after years of development, the program (then managed by defense contractor Raytheon) was in disarray. Costs skyrocketed past $85,000 per soldier for a 40-pound, turtle-shell collection of gear that would barely let an infantryman drop and roll.

Land Warrior was saved only by a crash 12-week program to replace military-spec equipment with commercially available technologies, including parts bought off the shelf from Fry's Electronics, the big California consumer retailer. That lowered the price and weight dramatically, and brought Land Warrior in line with the Defense Department's push to use more civilian gear. In testing, however, soldiers found the new Land Warrior equipment too fragile for the rough-and-tumble of combat. In 2003, another defense contractor, General Dynamics, was enlisted to ­create a third, military-hardened version of the system.

Today, Land Warrior weighs a comparatively trim 16 pounds, in part because extra batteries are now kept in the soldiers' vehicles instead of on their backs. Per-soldier costs are down to about $30,000. But despite 15 years of work and nearly $500 million, the system still has bugs. And some of the gear seems outdated, even before it goes off to war. The 400-MHz processor running the system would have been bleeding-edge -- in 1999.


Peek performance: The Land Warrior System, a wearable package of computers and other high-tech gear, includes a digital sight that lets soldiers aim at enemies without exposing themselves to danger.

In a parking lot adjacent to Alpha's faux-urban training grounds, Starks helps me into a Land Warrior ensemble, making sure I don't get my weapon entangled in the suit's wires. I point the M-4 across the lot at a row of rental cars. I wait -- and wait -- for the enhanced gunsight to focus. It responds more like a cheap digital camera than an advanced piece of military gear. At this speed, the sight would be nearly useless in fast-moving urban combat.

The map showing soldiers' locations isn't exactly quick, either. I walk around the lot. My position on the map lags about a minute behind where I am in real time. That kind of delay wouldn't be too important in a long-range duel of sharpshooters. But in an Iraq-style firefight it could be lethal. "There are still a lot of glitches," admits Alpha company's Lt. John Gelineau. And with a soldier's basic load of body armor, ammo and other equipment now approaching 80 pounds, even the slimmed-down Land Warrior System might be too much of a burden for an infantryman.

For now, the game plan among Land Warrior managers is to have only commanders carry the load. Just 230 of the 440 systems used at Fort Lewis will be brought to Iraq. After all, lieutenants, captains and senior sergeants are the ones who really need to know where all the troops are. Let them have the digital mapping gear and give privates and corporals simple beacons that broadcast their positions to higher-ups. "We may not have to belabor every rifleman with the full system," Hansen says.

Same goes for the radios. Land Warrior's wireless network makes it easy for a commander to plan missions on the run. But maybe the leaders of Alpha company's 11-man squads are the only ones who need to be on the receiving end of those transmissions; maybe they can, in turn, tell their soldiers what to do the old-fashioned way -- with hand signals and shouted orders. That would suit Starks just fine. "There are a lot of things I'd never use in my position," he says. "It seems like a lot of excessive stuff."

Some in the Army's upper echelons apparently feel the same way. Money has grown tight after six years of war in Afghanistan and four years in Iraq. The generals are looking to cut costs, and scrapping an experimental system like Land Warrior would appear to be an easy way to save a few hundred million. As it stands, the Army's new five-year budget eliminates funding for the gear.

Nevertheless, the 4-9th is pressing on with plans to go into battle wearing Land Warrior. The systems are already bought and paid for, and there is money in this year's budget to maintain the gear.

The hope is that Land Warrior will perform so well under fire that the Army's chiefs will have no choice but to keep funding the system. "It's kind of a Hail Mary pass," one Pentagon insider tells me. Give guys like Gelineau and Starks a few months with Land Warrior, the thinking goes, and they'll grow to love it, saving the 15-year effort.

So far, no dice. "Oh yeah, I can't wait!" an Alpha company soldier writes sarcastically in an e-mail months after I visit Fort Lewis and just before he's due for deployment to Iraq. "We still aren't fans."

That attitude could change -- quickly -- with a single good combat experience. But if it doesn't, it could mean that the dream of network-centric operations -- of linking every soldier into a battlefield web, of ensuring that every infantryman knows exactly who and what is in his combat zone -- will remain years in the distance.


Read more: The Army's New Land Warrior Gear: Why Soldiers Don't Like It - Popular Mechanics