Light Carrier Arguments

[Oldgateboatdriver]

It's just as stealthy as any American aircraft carrier, or flat deck amphibious assault vessel, or the Charles de Gaulle, or the Queen Elizabeth class, or the Mistral, or the Juan Carlos, or the Australian amphibious assault vessels.

Those things are just big. There is no hiding them.

 

[dimsum]

It's just as stealthy as any American aircraft carrier, or flat deck amphibious assault vessel, or the Charles de Gaulle, or the Queen Elizabeth class, or the Mistral, or the Juan Carlos, or the Australian amphibious assault vessels.

Those things are just big. There is no hiding them.

Exactly.  Also "stealth" is really just "low-observable" - get close enough and you'll be able to see it (via whatever sensor) anyways.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Exactly.  Also "stealth" is really just "low-observable" - get close enough and you'll be able to see it (via whatever sensor) anyways.

And if it's anchored in the harbor of your enemy's capital city, surrounding by smoking ruins topped by your flag, you don't have to worry about stealthy... much 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If you want a small carrier that is F-35 compatible, I would go for this instead of the hybrid "amphibious" warfare ships:

Still nice to have type ship, but I expect the more flexible, the easier the sell would be. 

 

[Kirkhill]

Fair Game on the stealth - so you can't hide a big boat. 

So the solutions are: 

Try to protect the boat - magnifying costs while minimizing capabilities because ultimately one boat can only be in one place at one time - concurrently this increases the number of lives at risk engaged in "unproductive" defensive roles.

Or

Build many boats of low cost with minimal bodies on board.  And if you do have to have bodies on board you bring them to the boat when you need them.  Don't be floating around the Briny with a 1000 troopies on board (or even 100 aircraft) unless you need them there.  Fly or boat self-loading cargo to a cheap flat spot between the waves when the situation warrants.

 

[tomahawk6]

Ships of this type operate with escorts. The nice aspect of the US amphib ships is that they can project power with their Marines and helicopters/soon to be F35's.

 

[Kirkhill]

My point is, T6, that when loaded with troops and aircraft the platform is a Very High Value Target.  Therefore wouldn't it be better to keep the Marines and Aircraft off the vessel and ashore for as long as possible.

15 Chinooks will cross deck 600 troops.  2 JHSV will do the same thing and allow the troops to bring heavier gear with them.
Aircraft, especially F35Bs can be kept in reserve and then just brought forwards to the platform in the numbers necessary for the mission.

And, with respect to the escorts, that, in my view, is the problem.  The VHVT demands the presence of escorts, each of which is a capital, manpower and operations draw and might be better employed dispersed than being forced to concentrate around the Target.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

And why not simply not have an army? If things go wrong, we could just snatch people off the street, give them guns and instruct them on the way while we get them to location on Air Canada planes!

I am jesting, of course, but I think you are missing the point, Chris.

These ships are not Very High Value targets because the marines are on board, they are VHVT because of the threat they represent to any enemy. Even without the Marines on board, they still cost 3.4 billion $US to build each and they still carry a huge amount of equipment to make opposed landings possible. That is enough to justify any enemy taking a serious crack at sinking them, even if the Marines aren't on board.

Moreover, where would you keep  those Marines? Another country? Not likely. They'd be in the US somewhere.

So your JHSV or Chinook option to bring the Marines back (and BTW, it's not 600: the America class or Wasp class before them carry 1750 Marines - and are usually accompanied by two other amphibious ships each carrying 750 more Marines) have to pick them up in the US and deliver them where? Logic dictates the large deck phib would have to remain within their "range" prior to reconnection. And compared to the ocean size and the potential destinations, both the Chinooks and JHSV have a limited range.

In your plan, if something goes wrong somewhere on earth, the Marines would have to assemble at their base in the US, embark on their Chinooks, fly to the amphibious assault ship, which would have to be within the flying range (only 400 Nautical Miles) of the US, wait for all the airplanes, and I guess their crew and support personnel, to arrive, then sail at the phib's  maximum speed (22 knots) to wherever on the planet they are needed. That is way, way, way too long.

A Marine Expeditionary Unit is the President's 911 force. When they are needed, they have to be there ... now. That is why the concept is forward deployment. At any given time four MEU(SOC) are forward deployed in areas where likely trouble spots are found, so they can be used quickly when the situation calls for it.

And while forward deployed, they don't need a huge escort situation, nor are they in danger from outside enemy until they are tasked to get close to shore for an operation.

I know we have satellite's galore, and new long range anti-ship weapons, etc. these days. But even with those, the oceans of the world - 2/3 of the planet's surface - are still the most wonderful hiding place ever. You are army, I believe, Chris. Think about it this way: If I gave you ten spy satellites and one hundred Search planes, and then asked you to find 5 main battle tanks and a couple dozen LAV's somewhere - anywhere - in Canada's whole land mass, and they are allowed to change location: how much time would you need? The answer is  a heck of a lot of time, if you ever manage to spot them. That's what is protecting the phibs until they are called in: not "stealth' by ship design, but stealth by  size of the hiding ground.
 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Brits tried the same thing, and still lost most of their helo's and trying to use commercial ships for aviation support took longer to convert than anticipated (kudeos for trying) Apparently the CO wanted the troops off the Sir Galahad asap, but was overruled. At some point in the operation, you are going to have to risk having all your eggs in one place. Having a amphib assault ship on something like the anti-piracy patrols would drive the coastal towns involved into a panic and disrupt the pirates bases, even if you did nothing. Do a few landings at low risk areas and you have upped the ante for them and force them to start moving high valued assets away from the coast.

 

[Kirkhill]

And why not simply not have an army? If things go wrong, we could just snatch people off the street, give them guns and instruct them on the way while we get them to location on Air Canada planes!

I am jesting, of course, but I think you are missing the point, Chris.

These ships are not Very High Value targets because the marines are on board, they are VHVT because of the threat they represent to any enemy. Even without the Marines on board, they still cost 3.4 billion $US to build each and they still carry a huge amount of equipment to make opposed landings possible. That is enough to justify any enemy taking a serious crack at sinking them, even if the Marines aren't on board.

Moreover, where would you keep  those Marines? Another country? Not likely. They'd be in the US somewhere.

So your JHSV or Chinook option to bring the Marines back (and BTW, it's not 600: the America class or Wasp class before them carry 1750 Marines - and are usually accompanied by two other amphibious ships each carrying 750 more Marines) have to pick them up in the US and deliver them where? Logic dictates the large deck phib would have to remain within their "range" prior to reconnection. And compared to the ocean size and the potential destinations, both the Chinooks and JHSV have a limited range.

In your plan, if something goes wrong somewhere on earth, the Marines would have to assemble at their base in the US, embark on their Chinooks, fly to the amphibious assault ship, which would have to be within the flying range (only 400 Nautical Miles) of the US, wait for all the airplanes, and I guess their crew and support personnel, to arrive, then sail at the phib's  maximum speed (22 knots) to wherever on the planet they are needed. That is way, way, way too long.

A Marine Expeditionary Unit is the President's 911 force. When they are needed, they have to be there ... now. That is why the concept is forward deployment. At any given time four MEU(SOC) are forward deployed in areas where likely trouble spots are found, so they can be used quickly when the situation calls for it.

And while forward deployed, they don't need a huge escort situation, nor are they in danger from outside enemy until they are tasked to get close to shore for an operation.

I know we have satellite's galore, and new long range anti-ship weapons, etc. these days. But even with those, the oceans of the world - 2/3 of the planet's surface - are still the most wonderful hiding place ever. You are army, I believe, Chris. Think about it this way: If I gave you ten spy satellites and one hundred Search planes, and then asked you to find 5 main battle tanks and a couple dozen LAV's somewhere - anywhere - in Canada's whole land mass, and they are allowed to change location: how much time would you need? The answer is  a heck of a lot of time, if you ever manage to spot them. That's what is protecting the phibs until they are called in: not "stealth' by ship design, but stealth by  size of the hiding ground.

Suppose you fly the troops from San Diego to Diego Garcia on commercial air?  And haul the Chinooks by C5/C17.  Allow a week for assembly of Troops and Craft.

Chinooks will lift the troops 500 km (if no refuelling at destination platform - 90% of 1100 km if refuelling is available at the destination) http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft-current/ch-147f.page

A JHSV will lift the troops about twice that distance.

Which is cheaper and more effective - a Very Large Flat Top or

A collection of commercial grade logistics vessels with flat tops, self propelled submersible barges and a bundle of Absalon standard Command and Support vessels from which small bodies of troops can operate?

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/exclusive-photo-usns-montford-point-the-navys-new-sea-1567333241

Edit: I don't dispute the need for the current standards of CVNs, CVs and LPH(D)s.  There is obviously a need for them.  I just suggest that there are other ways of doing some of the things that only they can currently do.

Consider the difference between the RN's Ark Royal in WW and D-Days Mulberry.  In this case I am proposing a deep sea version of Mulberry that can be assembled 1000 km off the target shore.

http://www.engineering-timelines.com/who/Hughes_HI/hughesHughIorys.asp

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It's no easy task to assemble those commercial ships, chartering them and dealing with crewing issues (the bridge crew and the engineroom crews might be different nationalities and perhaps a nationality hostile to your intent). It would have been impossible during the economic peak to find the ships. They may be an option for long drawn out operation with lot's of lead time and one has to consider things like landing in foreign ports like what just happened to Singapore or a contract dispute which happened to Canada. Yes you will need commercial support, but the pointy end and quick reaction stuff will need to be naval and/or Naval Auxiliary.     

 

[a_majoor]

We could combine a few disparate threads however.

There is no reason that Canada's naval shipbuilding industry is at the mercy of feast or famine decisions by the government, if part of the strategy is to build a slow but steady stream of these sorts of support vessels Chris is advocating for. The GoC can even make a small bit of the cost back by leasing them out.

For wartime and emergency use, the ones which are laid up in reserve are manned and run by the Naval Reserve, who of course would be training on these ships and perhaps being part of the charter package when someone wants to lease a submersible barge from the GoC. And the USN has demonstrated various "packages" that are essentially armed ISO containers which can be bolted to the deck of a ship, so your barge suddenly has a CIWS or SAM launcher (and in the future, perhaps a 100kW laser emitter). Data links to "real" warships and warplanes provide the means to actually use these weapons as part off the larger task force umbrella.

Not exactly a totally ideal situation, but the Naval Reserve would have a sustainment role and capable of coming in the second wave with all the extra "stuff" that longer duration missions might need, and the fleet has a supply of specialist ships and crews to man them.

 

[GR66]

We could combine a few disparate threads however.

There is no reason that Canada's naval shipbuilding industry is at the mercy of feast or famine decisions by the government, if part of the strategy is to build a slow but steady stream of these sorts of support vessels Chris is advocating for. The GoC can even make a small bit of the cost back by leasing them out.

For wartime and emergency use, the ones which are laid up in reserve are manned and run by the Naval Reserve, who of course would be training on these ships and perhaps being part of the charter package when someone wants to lease a submersible barge from the GoC. And the USN has demonstrated various "packages" that are essentially armed ISO containers which can be bolted to the deck of a ship, so your barge suddenly has a CIWS or SAM launcher (and in the future, perhaps a 100kW laser emitter). Data links to "real" warships and warplanes provide the means to actually use these weapons as part off the larger task force umbrella.

Not exactly a totally ideal situation, but the Naval Reserve would have a sustainment role and capable of coming in the second wave with all the extra "stuff" that longer duration missions might need, and the fleet has a supply of specialist ships and crews to man them.

Getting very off topic with regard to light carriers, but this kind of approach could possibly be used with the Canadian Surface Combatant.  Assuming whatever design is selected has a useful sized helicopter deck, a flex deck of some sort that can be used for either accommodation of troops, vehicle transport, or modular sensors/weapons (something Absalon-ish?), then you could have your 12-15 CSCs followed by 12 x Kingston-class replacements using the same hulls and engines.  They just wouldn't have the same weapons and sensor suite (maybe just a 57mm gun? or RWS, etc.?).  This could keep the production lines running until it's time to again replace the CSC's.

Several people discussing the CSC have noted that it's the weapons and sensors that are the major costs in warship production.  "De-armed" CSCs to replace the Kingston-Class would give you a significant commonality in mechanical components and training.  The larger design would be very useful in many non-combat operations and in time of war they could become very useful in the key role of convoy escorts by adding an ASW helicopter and a modular towed-array sonar (freeing up the fully-armed versions for areas where a more multi-role capable ship is needed).

Sorry for the derail.

 

[Kirkhill]

No derail perceived here.

I can see a spectrum of "flat tops" ranging downwards from CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LPHs, LSD(A)s, to Absalon-ish Comd & Spt ships and then back up the other side through Container Ship Conversions like the US Special Forces support ship Ocean Trader

  along with Davies's and Irving's own proposed commercial conversions. 

It would be interesting to see what a decked over super-tanker, with a sea crew of 13 to 20 would cost and what capabilities it might add.

 

[tomahawk6]

My point is, T6, that when loaded with troops and aircraft the platform is a Very High Value Target.  Therefore wouldn't it be better to keep the Marines and Aircraft off the vessel and ashore for as long as possible.

15 Chinooks will cross deck 600 troops.  2 JHSV will do the same thing and allow the troops to bring heavier gear with them.
Aircraft, especially F35Bs can be kept in reserve and then just brought forwards to the platform in the numbers necessary for the mission.

And, with respect to the escorts, that, in my view, is the problem.  The VHVT demands the presence of escorts, each of which is a capital, manpower and operations draw and might be better employed dispersed than being forced to concentrate around the Target.

US amphib ships have a well deck for delivering Marines or non-lethal aid for disaster relief ops. Usually there is an attack sub assigned to both the CVA and LHD. The LHD capability is at the link below.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=400&ct=4

USS Makin Island

 

[a_majoor]

If we are looking for adapt le commercial designs, the modern car carrier might be one place to look. It has deck space for hundreds of wheeled vehicles and the ability to roll them on and off the decks. Most designs have flat upper decks as well.

To militarize the design, the decks and ramps need to be strong enough to carry tracked vehicles, most of the upper decks would be used to store supplies and carry troop accommodations and the upper deck strengthened to allow helicopters to take off and land. Fitting CIWS mounts at either end is probably a good idea as well.

This would be a "big honking ship" (indeed, conversions of existing ships would be massively oversized for Canadian use unless many decks were removed and the ship essentially lowered), but would have the versatility to be used for a multitude of supply and delivery tasks.