My thoughts on EX Stalwart Guardian 2014

[2ndChoiceName]

Good day,

I just returned from EX Stalwart Guardian, my first large ex, and I had a few questions about things that happened over the course of the ex which helped reinforce the thoughts I was kind of already having. I still learned a lot on the ex about how an Armd Recce Troop operates, what works during extended stays in the field and what doesn't, and I was especially lucky to the the gunner for the Troopy's C/S, so I got maybe a bit more SA than if I was in a different patrol, however I still had some thoughts about the ex that I would like to share here. These thoughts are basically that the Army has no idea how to use Armoured Recce, at least in the Reserves, and I feel as though the Armoured Corps (again, in the Reserves) is getting the short end of the stick with the shortening of courses that is happening. My evidence for this is as such:

1) We were told at the beginning of the ex, expect to have a more aggressive role as Divisional level recce, you will be employed in a more direct role such as screening forces, guard forces, etc., but were then stuck in OPs for most of the ex, which I am told is the norm for most of the exes like this. I realize OPs are a large part of what Armoured Recce does, but it would have been nice to have some other training as well on the other parts of the Armoured Recce role. I know this is not a new phenomenon, research into the history of my Regiment shows that it was retasked as conventional Armour, to Armd Recce, back to Armour several times during WW2.

2) They took our ammo. During the last few days of the ex, our ammo was taken away. I don't know whether it was given to other units for their training or taken for some other reason but either way, yelling "bang bang" at targets was less than satisfying, especially since we were under orders to attack any OPFOR element under section size. I don't really know what they expected us to do without any ammunition.

3) Only the C6 gunners were given WES gear. Apparently they either forgot about the Armour or deliberately excluded us. I suppose that makes fiscal sense, but when we had dismounted elements on the one attack we did end up doing (an "unscripted" event if you will), we effectively had only one operational C6 since we had dismounted the other gunner with the Junior C/S.

3) I did not feel as though our presence was affecting the battle at all. For example, we told Infantry elements 3 separate times where our OP was set up, what we had seen, etc. And the next day they still attacked the woods we had set up in, called arty on us, conducted section attacks on our G Wagons.

4) The Reserve Armour DP1 has been shortened and condensed so it is now 5 weeks long, and qualifies the soldier for DP1 and 2. Compared to the Infantry, which has retained the 8 week course. I know things are rough all over now with the budget, and I don't know what's happening with the other trades but I certainly don't like that the courses have been shortened significantly.

I know there are more if I think a little harder but those are the points that came to mind right away. I certainly don't claim to have a solution, and I may be outside my lanes but I don't think it takes 30 years experience to see the things that I'm seeing. I'd be interested to see what the more experienced members of the Armoured Corps think of this.

 

[acen]

I wasn't on SG 14 but it sounds like perennial complaints from the armoured recce side that have been going on for years. On some brigade/div ex's, even the infantry was not employed properly (or at all). Trillium Response a couple years back consisted of sitting in an arctic tent for 10 days with zero employment besides a two man walk around the camp every hour. Sometimes these exercises are not necessarily about individual training but rather training for the higher ranks, though these do not need to be mutually exclusive. Normally the blue on blue confusion stems from the fact that the "enemy" is wearing "stolen canadian uniforms and weapons", though it's no excuse for the lack of communication down to the infantry platoon (bad set of orders?). At the end of the day, it normally falls down to section leadership to provide some form of training value for their troops. I'm sure you probably had enough downtime to be given some informal lessons on advanced skills related to your trade/vehicle or even an intro to battle procedure and how it affects you in the grand scheme of things. Ask tons of questions, that's your time to learn as well.

FYI, the infantry have also had their course cut down and gutted of content. Instead of the 8 weeks you are talking about, it takes place in 6. I'm pretty sure this has happened across the board as well. Once you get up to leadership level courses, you'll most likely find that you will be on par with the regular force (possibly in a mixed course). It's not hard to look at the economics of it all: how much does it cost to feed you and the couple thousand other trainees for a few more weeks? How many of those soldiers will then stay in the army for more than a year? What about 5 years? The content that is cut out is generally tasked to the units to cover during their training cycle, so realistically you shouldnt be missing out on too much and they are skills that you will want to refresh periodically anyhow (not just for new guys).

Welcome to the Mo, where just like everything in life, you get out what you put in.

 

[George Wallace]

Good day,

I just returned from EX Stalwart Guardian, my first large ex, and I had a few questions about things that happened over the course of the ex which helped reinforce the thoughts I was kind of already having. I still learned a lot on the ex about how an Armd Recce Troop operates, what works during extended stays in the field and what doesn't, and I was especially lucky to the the gunner for the Troopy's C/S, so I got maybe a bit more SA than if I was in a different patrol, however I still had some thoughts about the ex that I would like to share here. These thoughts are basically that the Army has no idea how to use Armoured Recce, at least in the Reserves, and I feel as though the Armoured Corps (again, in the Reserves) is getting the short end of the stick with the shortening of courses that is happening. My evidence for this is as such:

1) We were told at the beginning of the ex, expect to have a more aggressive role as Divisional level recce, you will be employed in a more direct role such as screening forces, guard forces, etc., but were then stuck in OPs for most of the ex, which I am told is the norm for most of the exes like this. I realize OPs are a large part of what Armoured Recce does, but it would have been nice to have some other training as well on the other parts of the Armoured Recce role. .......

OPs are what you will do in a SCREEN or GUARD FORCE. 

2) They took our ammo. During the last few days of the ex, our ammo was taken away. I don't know whether it was given to other units for their training or taken for some other reason but either way, yelling "bang bang" at targets was less than satisfying, especially since we were under orders to attack any OPFOR element under section size. I don't really know what they expected us to do without any ammunition.

Welcome to the Reserves, and the CAF.  You can find this story being told by many a Reservist through the decades.  Stories you will tell many years from now.

3) Only the C6 gunners were given WES gear. Apparently they either forgot about the Armour or deliberately excluded us. I suppose that makes fiscal sense, but when we had dismounted elements on the one attack we did end up doing (an "unscripted" event if you will), we effectively had only one operational C6 since we had dismounted the other gunner with the Junior C/S.

Like the 'bullets', WES gear is scarce. 

3) I did not feel as though our presence was affecting the battle at all. For example, we told Infantry elements 3 separate times where our OP was set up, what we had seen, etc. And the next day they still attacked the woods we had set up in, called arty on us, conducted section attacks on our G Wagons.

Many reasons that this may have happened.  One would be that you (your Patrol/OP commander) gave the wrong Grid.  Two would be that the Infantry couldn't read a map or plot a Grid.  Three, someone in a HQ failed on all parts; getting and plotting your Grid, ordering the Infantry to attack the wrong Grid, incompetence on all parts, etc.  Poor state of affairs that it happened and someone should answer for it.

4) The Reserve Armour DP1 has been shortened and condensed so it is now 5 weeks long, and qualifies the soldier for DP1 and 2. Compared to the Infantry, which has retained the 8 week course. I know things are rough all over now with the budget, and I don't know what's happening with the other trades but I certainly don't like that the courses have been shortened significantly.

At a level way above your Pay Grade, someone has decided to cut a 'Budget' to save MONEY.  Just another fact of life in the CAF.

I know there are more if I think a little harder but those are the points that came to mind right away. I certainly don't claim to have a solution, and I may be outside my lanes but I don't think it takes 30 years experience to see the things that I'm seeing. I'd be interested to see what the more experienced members of the Armoured Corps think of this.

Wait until you reach higher ranks and then how much more detail you will witness in why all of this happens.

 

[Oompah-Loompah@]

3) I did not feel as though our presence was affecting the battle at all. For example, we told Infantry elements 3 separate times where our OP was set up, what we had seen, etc. And the next day they still attacked the woods we had set up in, called arty on us, conducted section attacks on our G Wagons.

I can only really speak for this point. In one of our attacks, the Armoured Recce told us they were in a different pos altogether. They were also wearing tilly caps and chilling on top of their G-Wagons. We were specifically told to watch for tillies, and shoot those on sight during attacks.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I can only really speak for this point. In one of our attacks, the Armoured Recce told us they were in a different pos altogether. They were also wearing tilly caps and chilling on top of their G-Wagons. We were specifically told to watch for tillies, and shoot those on sight during attacks.

All those tillies, reporting the wrong position and 'chilling' on their G-Wagons would suggest what they were doing was part of the MEL, and they were there for your benefit.

 

[Remius]

All those tillies, reporting the wrong position and 'chilling' on their G-Wagons would suggest what they were doing was part of the MEL, and they were there for your benefit.

No there was a definite screw up in that situation.  Both the infantry guys and the armoured recceguys did a few things wrong there with the the recce guys being the catalyst.  And definitly some ex-con stuff as well.  But that's why we train, lessons learned.

To the OP, there was ammo shortages everywhere, and most of our company had no wes for our C-6s at all.

 

[Journeyman]

I was one of the Observer Controller Trainers (CMTC armband, no helmet/cam, god gun)

2) They took our ammo.

Ammo shortages became apparent around Wednesday, and redistribution occurred during Thursday's battle procedure prior to the final TBG attacks. Recce and Svc Bn elements had expended the least ammo, so they were the obvious sources.

3) Only the C6 gunners were given WES gear. Apparently they either forgot about the Armour or deliberately excluded us.

The exercise planners decided (or were directed; above my pay grade so not sure which) that Infantry was the focus of the WES gear. Very few C6/C9 had WES gear, so it was up to the OCT to keep it fair.

I did not feel as though our presence was affecting the battle at all. For example, we told Infantry elements 3 separate times where our OP was set up, what we had seen, etc. And the next day they still attacked the woods we had set up in, called arty on us, conducted section attacks on our G Wagons.

Two reoccurring factors: 1) Infantry poorly using info updates, regardless of whether it came from Recce, Int, IA, etc. This seemed to be because it either "interfered" with their estimate process or because the info was in a form that required additional thought when the Pl Comd believed he didn't have time to work through to the "so what"; 2) info of little tactical value caused the Inf to dismiss all such inputs. This tended to be vague info (from IA) or irrelevant 'big picture' info (from Int). 

As for the attack on your G Wagons.....it sounds like the 32 CBG fight near the Niagara River between Ft Erie and Chippawa; there were several "WTF" moments with that one.  The most useful "recce" info was seeing where vehicles had been bogged multiple times along the black track before we got there.  But that attack also featured leaving the Coy Wpns det behind, a beautiful pincer movement through thick woods -- until it turned into blue-on-blue, and finding a G Wagon off the black track with no soldiers....windows rolled down.....serialized kit....and, oh look, a C7 in the back seat.  :facepalm:

Normally the blue on blue confusion stems from the fact that the "enemy" is wearing "stolen canadian uniforms and weapons".....

We were specifically told to watch for tillies, and shoot those on sight during attacks.

All Coys were briefed that COEFOR were wearing either Tiger-stripe, Arid, or Black/Grey/White cam, NO CADPAT/NO TILLIES.  Passage of info was a problem throughout.


As noted above, make the most of the training opportunity -- both what to improve and what to sustain.

Armoured Recce.....were also wearing tilly caps and chilling on top of their G-Wagons.

For a black-hatter, that's "tactical"    >

 

[2ndChoiceName]

As noted above, make the most of the training opportunity -- both what to improve and what to sustain.

I agree with that, I did learn a lot and we were lucky to have a good Troop leader who valued our input and was willing to admit his shortcomings and acknowledge what we could have done better, what worked well, how we would have done things differently, etc...

 

[acen]

All Coys were briefed that COEFOR were wearing either Tiger-stripe, Arid, or Black/Grey/White cam, NO CADPAT/NO TILLIES.  Passage of info was a problem throughout.

As mentioned above, I was not on SG 14 but my statement was a broad reflection of what typically happens on brigade+ exes. I imagine stories will be told about this for months/years just the same as any other area concentration.

 

[Spanky]

I just got off of the ex as well.  I was employed as a troop warrant for an armd recce troop.  We spent a lot of time in OPs, but as was posted earlier that is a part of being a guard/screen.  We spent two days in an OP which was not exactly high speed stuff but certainly worthwhile and not something that we've been able to practice for a long time.
The one time we were tasked to marry up with an infantry company, there were problems with radio freqs and coordination at a higher level.  We established our OPs anyway and did marry up with the infantry recce det pretty much by accident.  The information we provided them was appreciated, and assisted them greatly in their assault on the airstrip.  Liaison at that level was effective and positive.
We later did a recce on the ship yard in Port Colborne.  This was the final objective of the ex.  The information we provided on the ground, shore, and approaches was extremely valuable and had an impact on the plans for the assault. 
Prior to the final assault, we established an OP on the eighth floor of the grain elevator of a flour mill and was able to see 100% of the NAI.  The real time information we were able to provide was passed on and, we hope, made it to the infantry in time to make a difference.  Our troops had a great time, and our DP1 drivers learned a lot about our trade.  It was probably my final ex and as such I was glad I went.
At no time were my troops sitting in the hatch wearing their soft caps.

 

[brihard]

As for the attack on your G Wagons.....it sounds like the 32 CBG fight near the Niagara River between Ft Erie and Chippawa; there were several "WTF" moments with that one.  The most useful "recce" info was seeing where vehicles had been bogged multiple times along the black track before we got there.  But that attack also featured leaving the Coy Wpns det behind, a beautiful pincer movement through thick woods -- until it turned into blue-on-blue,

Sounds like a wonderfully executed rambush.

 

[ArmyRick]

I was on the ex as well. I was part of COEFOR and yes our uniforms were distinctly different. We were accused only by 32 CBG of cheating but I assure you, we were not.

 

[2ndChoiceName]

I just got off of the ex as well.  I was employed as a troop warrant for an armd recce troop.  We spent a lot of time in OPs, but as was posted earlier that is a part of being a guard/screen.  We spent two days in an OP which was not exactly high speed stuff but certainly worthwhile and not something that we've been able to practice for a long time.
The one time we were tasked to marry up with an infantry company, there were problems with radio freqs and coordination at a higher level.  We established our OPs anyway and did marry up with the infantry recce det pretty much by accident.  The information we provided them was appreciated, and assisted them greatly in their assault on the airstrip.  Liaison at that level was effective and positive.
We later did a recce on the ship yard in Port Colborne.  This was the final objective of the ex.  The information we provided on the ground, shore, and approaches was extremely valuable and had an impact on the plans for the assault. 
Prior to the final assault, we established an OP on the eighth floor of the grain elevator of a flour mill and was able to see 100% of the NAI.  The real time information we were able to provide was passed on and, we hope, made it to the infantry in time to make a difference.  Our troops had a great time, and our DP1 drivers learned a lot about our trade.  It was probably my final ex and as such I was glad I went.
At no time were my troops sitting in the hatch wearing their soft caps.

That sounds like much more of what I was hoping for from this ex. Maybe your Sqn was given different, more dynamic objectives or just lucked out but either way it's reassuring that not everyone had my experience. You mentioned comms as well, which may have compounded the problems we experienced, because at least in our Squadron, comms were an absolutely unbelievable shitshow.

 

[Infanteer]

"Sitting in an OP" is an excellent opportunity to conduct routine, something we don't get to do as often as we should (same as a trench).  We had regular force Recce Pl pers on an international exercise able to conduct OPs for five days - the Sgts were happy to teach guys things like pers management, changing vegetation around the OP, covert resupply, etc.

I've observed force on force exercises where OP routine was poorly run and wasn't surprised when the screen was rolled up by the enemy.

 

[George Wallace]

That sounds like much more of what I was hoping for from this ex. Maybe your Sqn was given different, more dynamic objectives or just lucked out but either way it's reassuring that not everyone had my experience. You mentioned comms as well, which may have compounded the problems we experienced, because at least in our Squadron, comms were an absolutely unbelievable shitshow.

Not everyone is lucky to have good, imaginative and knowledgeable leaders.  If you were stuck with a lazy plug with a complete lack of leadership skills and Trade knowledge, you will not have benefited much; other to learn what NOT to do.  There is no failure; just different lessons learned.  With good knowledgeable leaders you learn what to do.  With poor leaders, you learn what NOT TO DO.  Whatever the case, it is still a learning experience that you can take lessons from and develop your career.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Sounds like a good exercise. Perfection is for the parade square - field training is supposed to stress the unit and find areas to work on.

 

[Spanky]

That sounds like much more of what I was hoping for from this ex. Maybe your Sqn was given different, more dynamic objectives or just lucked out but either way it's reassuring that not everyone had my experience. You mentioned comms as well, which may have compounded the problems we experienced, because at least in our Squadron, comms were an absolutely unbelievable shitshow.

We were in B Sqn. We were lucky enough to have 0 vehicle problems and comms in every call sign worked.  I guess the force was with us.  ;D.  I don't know if the objectives were more dynamic or not, and maybe we did luck out, but the troop from drivers to observers to crew commanders did a great job, and I'll attribute that to the results.  I was proud of them and grateful that they made my final ex such a success. 

 

[2ndChoiceName]

I was in C. Our Troopy was texting the BC the whole time because that's the only way we could get reliable orders. You mention your troops' professionalism, which I also experienced. Regardless of orders and objectives etc., all the people I worked with knew their stuff and were professional and hard working and always willing to answer my questions and offer advice. Glad you had a good time on the ex and despite everything I'm already excited for next year's