Taliban Morale at All-Time High & Taliban frustrated over handling of their amnesty

[Gunnar]

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061008/workman_taliban/20061008/

I love this.

We're sick of being shot, and people don't like us.  We just want to go home.

Have you changed your opinions?

No, not really.  We just don't want to be shot at any more.  And our relatives are giving us hell since our friends in the Taliban blew up their kids' school.

Great.  Want to show us some good faith, by helping us eliminate the Taliban?

No, not really.  We just don't want to be shot at any more.  Can't we just back out of this without being on any side at all?

 

[cplcaldwell]

They sound like NDP to me......

 

[tomahawk6]

Dont believe their morale is sky high, maybe the Taliban are high or they really look forward to going to paradise. In any event if they dont lay down their weapons they better make reservations for the next shuttle to paradise.

 

[McG]

I'm not certain that the initial article suggests Taliban moral is high but that weaknesses in the amnesty program may eventually lead some back to the enemy(the amnesty is supposed to offer a path for militant Taliban to become non-combatants and return to a normal life.  It means they are no longer part of the problem).  This article certainly does not support the idea of improved moral.

NATO spokesman says violence subsiding in southern Afghanistan
Canadian Press
Published: Wednesday, October 11, 2006

KABUL - The number of clashes between NATO-led forces and insurgents has dropped following intense combat that rocked the south of the country earlier this year, opening the way for reconstruction projects, a NATO spokesman said Wednesday.

Mark Laity also said there has been a rise in the use of suicide and roadside bombs corresponding with the subsiding number of direct confrontations.

There were more than 500 clashes in August and close to 400 in September, the two months that saw the most fighting between Taliban militants and western troops since the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001, said Laity.

Since the end of a major anti-Taliban military offensive in the south of the country known as Operation Medusa, the number of clashes has dropped by half, Laity said.

"The significance of this is . . . we have defeated the Taliban in direct combat, and as a result there has been a big reduction in these kind of incidents," Laity told reporters. He did not elaborate with figures.

Afghanistan is going through its worst period of violence since 2001, with insurgents battling Afghan and foreign troops, particularly in the south and east of the country. Militants are also increasing their use of roadside and suicide attacks in their campaign to weaken the government.

NATO Gen. David Richards told The Associated Press on Sunday that a majority of Afghans would likely switch their allegiance to the Taliban if their lives show no visible improvements in the next six months.

There are some 2,300 Canadian troops in southern Kandahar province. Forty Canadian soldiers have died since 2002.

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=f9130898-8bdc-4d10-a813-72cc23f842bd&k=59036

 

[Bigmac]

  The Taliban are beginning to organize as seen by the increase in numbers fighting. We were all surprised by the numbers of fighters they were able to amass this spring and summer. Don't be lulled into thinking that just because they were defeated in a battle of large scale that they feel defeated. Death in battle is honor to them. They have learned that they are not prepared for head on battles with NATO forces so they will go back to guerilla tactics to try to decrease our morale.
  The winter is approaching so they will hide in the mountains and prepare for the next spring offensive. Make no bones about it they will return in full force again next spring. NATO must also prepare for next spring and gather intelligence. Perhaps even launch a winter campaign to disrupt the Taliban in the mountains and their training camps in Pakistan.
    Below is a link to an Asia Times article including an interview with a top Taliban leader. A good read.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ06Df01.html

 

[vonGarvin]

   The winter is approaching so they will hide in the mountains and prepare for the next spring offensive. Make no bones about it they will return in full force again next spring. NATO must also prepare for next spring and gather intelligence. Perhaps even launch a winter campaign to disrupt the Taliban in the mountains and their training camps in Pakistan.

THIS I think is key.  Waiting for spring for them to attack is fruitless.  If an analogy from WWII Eastern front can be used, look at the German's initial prowess in Summer, and the Soviets in Winter.  If you look at what happened in 1943, the Soviets had indeed mastered "operational" warfare, and played upon the Germans by letting them attack and then bent the German Army over their collective knees and spanked them, and hard, for two years.  How to apply this to now?  Go after the Taliban in the winter in their supposed hides (Mountains), and keep them on the run and keep them from regrouping.  Sure, a reaction could be more infiltrations into cities and bombings and the like, but with a proper spin, that could backfire on them

 

[Kirkhill]

I know that there is a lot of concern about armed militias, especially in light of the experience in Iraq with the Sadr and Badr brigades. However I would also note that the Omani insurgency of the 60's and 70's was partly contained by the raising of local tribal militias (Firqats) officered by foreigners (Brits).  Their loyalty may have been bought (goats, cash, wells....) but apparently they stayed bought long enough for the Sultan to gain a more substantial loyalty/authority.

This business in Helmand province with the Brits where the Brits agreed to withdraw if the Taliban withdrew and the locals ended up hanging a Taliban "dissenter": is it possible that Firqats could be organized around the existing tribes?  The tribes seem to be pretty autonomous - hence the Loya Jirgas.  It seems to me that phase one in this insurgency may not so much demand disarming the locals as co-opting them.  Creating "well regulated" militias if you will.  Militias that can impose local order and provide local security but that are not so well armed or formed in large enough units to be a threat to modern forces.  Another American analogy might be the success of their SF types with the Hmong in the highlands of Vietnam.

So in addition to a strategy QRFs and going after Taliban in the winter quarters; building roads, schools and digging wells; establishing government posts manned by either/or MNF and ASF personnel, is there an option to get the local headman to form a local militia who the government pays to provide security against the Taliban?  How much would it cost to pay these guys enough that it would offset the value of the poppy to the local economy?  Would they stay bought?  Would they respond to training so that time spent in training (and perhaps more generally, education) would keep them away from the fields?

 

[McG]

The winter is approaching so they will hide in the mountains and prepare for the next spring offensive.

I would not put money on this.  I now it has been common practice for them, but it has also been a declining practice.  I would not be surprised to see a fight through the winter.

 

[GAP]

I would not put money on this.  I now it has been common practice for them, but it has also been a declining practice.  I would not be surprised to see a fight through the winter.

Especially if they figure we are counting on them going back to Pakistan for the winter.

 

[Infanteer]

I know that there is a lot of concern about armed militias, especially in light of the experience in Iraq with the Sadr and Badr brigades. However I would also note that the Omani insurgency of the 60's and 70's was partly contained by the raising of local tribal militias (Firqats) officered by foreigners (Brits).  Their loyalty may have been bought (goats, cash, wells....) but apparently they stayed bought long enough for the Sultan to gain a more substantial loyalty/authority.

Gee...sounds like SF role right there - good thing CSOR is getting off the ground....